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Dollar Unilateralism:
The New Frontline of National Security
SUZANNE KATZENSTEIN

*

This Article makes three points. First, it draws attention to a profound shift
toward “dollar unilateralism” by the U.S. government as it advances core national
security goals. Relying on the special status of the U.S. dollar, the government has
enlisted foreign banks to isolate targeted entities and track illicit financial flows.
Second, drawing on examples such as Iran’s nuclear program, the Article identifies
three formal and informal legal tactics the government has used to implement
dollar unilateralism: financial sticks, high-profile blacklists, and direct diplomacy.
Finally, the Article discusses the efficacy of dollar unilateralism and its
implications for U.S. accountability. Dollar unilateralism challenges a
conventional view about the inevitability of multilateral cooperation, and is a
compelling strategy under three conditions. It also, however, presents new gaps in
U.S. political accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has enlisted a range of domestic private and
international governmental actors to advance its counterterrorism and nuclear
nonproliferation objectives. At the domestic level, the United States has relied on
corporate participants in surveillance operations, such as PRISM1 and

* Research Scholar and Project Director, Kenan Institute for Ethics. For helpful
comments, I am grateful to Diane Amann, Lawrence Baxter, Joseph Blocher, Jamie Boyle,
Curt Bradley, Rachel Brewster, Al Brophy, Guy Charles, John Coyle, Chris Griffin, Lisa
Griffin, Larry Helfer, Maggie Lemos, Marin Levy, Ann Lipton, Eric Lorber, Ralf Michaels,
Peter Katzenstein, the Duke junior faculty summer workshop, and the ASIL-SE Junior Senior
Workshop. I am indebted to Rachel Evans and Ben Oster for their superb research assistance,
and I thank Joseph Dugan, Joseph Stephens, and members of the Indiana Law Journal for their
editorial assistance. All errors are mine alone.
1. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of
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Xkeyscore,2 to gain access to data on telephone calls and emails involving both
U.S. citizens and foreigners. Domestic law scholars have offered probing
accounts of these programs, concentrating on their constitutional and normative
implications.3 In the international arena, the United States has turned to
international organizations, including the United Nations (U.N.) and the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) to implement anti–money laundering and
counterterrorist financing policies. International law scholars have offered cogent
analyses of these policies, focusing especially on their implications for human
rights and international cooperation more generally.4
Lost in a gap between the domestic and international law literatures is a
significant shift in government strategy—that is, the government’s attempt to enlist
foreign banks, not simply domestic firms or foreign governments, to pursue vital
national security goals. More specifically, the government has turned to foreign
banks to advance two core security objectives: stopping the financing of terrorism
and nuclear proliferation (“cutting off the financial pipeline”) and collecting
financial data to identify illicit networks (“following the money”). While the
government has previously used economic statecraft—such as trade embargoes and
export controls—to shape the incentives of foreign firms, this is the first time it has
ever deployed its current strategy of using its financial power to influence foreign
banks with the goal of isolating targeted countries and entities.
The government’s harnessing of foreign banks opens the door to a new form of
unilateralism, which this Article terms “dollar unilateralism.”5 Dollar unilateralism
occurs when the government uses the unique status of the U.S. dollar in global
financial markets to pursue policy goals independently, rather than work through
Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 6, 2013, at A1, available at
http://theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
2. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User Does on
the Internet,” GUARDIAN (U.K.) (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data.
3. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2011); Amitai Etzioni, The
Privacy Merchants: What Is to Be Done?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929 (2012); Jon D.
Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on
Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901 (2008) [hereinafter Michaels, All the President’s Spies];
Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317 (2008); Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and
Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 191 (2011); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World:
First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741 (2008).
4. E.g., Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving
the Effectiveness and Accountability of Transgovernmental Networks, 22 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 1 (2008); Andrew Hudson, Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s
Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 203 (2007).
5. This Article emphasizes the procedural dimension of unilateralism and adopts a
definition used by other scholars. As Monica Hakimi writes, “A state acts unilaterally when
it does not channel through a formal international process the decision to act.” Monica
Hakimi, Unfriendly Unilateralism, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 105, 111 (2014); see also W.
Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive
Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3, 3 (2000).
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traditional inter-governmental and multilateral channels. This new strategy, deployed
for national security objectives, raises a host of more specific questions: How precisely
is the government able to harness foreign banks, including those without ties to the
United States? Why do foreign banks cooperate with the government’s strategy,
especially when they are under no legal obligation to do so? What are the implications
of this shift in security strategy for future U.S. policy and U.S. accountability?
This Article suggests that the government elicits cooperation from foreign
banks, including those with weak or no ties to the United States, by deploying three
tactics that fall along a continuum of legal formality: financial sticks, high-profile
blacklists, and direct diplomacy. Financial sticks are the most formal and
conventional of the three tools. They are congressional or executive measures that
impose obligations on U.S. actors, but with the goal of pressuring foreign banks. As
defined in this Article, high-profile blacklists involve the naming of entities or
regions as potentially engaging in illicit conduct but without imposing obligations
on U.S. financial actors. These are semiformal legal measures given that they are
authorized as the first step under section 311 of the Patriot Act,6 but do not require
U.S. banks to take any measures (this legal directive occurs at the optional second
step). Still, for material and reputational reasons, the government expects such
blacklists to make not only U.S. but also foreign banks reduce their business with
the named entities. Finally, the government, specifically the Treasury Department,
has employed a systematic campaign that this Article terms “direct diplomacy.” In
an effort to persuade foreign banks to implement U.S. policy, high-ranking U.S.
officials meet with foreign bank executives directly rather than attempt to influence
them indirectly through interactions with their governments. This is the most
informal of the three tactics; although Treasury can point to congressional statutes
and executive orders granting it authority to take diplomatic action, these sources
do not explicitly enumerate Treasury’s responsibilities to engage in diplomacy but
instead invest Treasury with broad discretionary powers. Treasury’s use of direct
diplomacy, moreover, does not involve imposing legal obligations on any actors.
Foreign banks appear to cooperate with U.S. harnessing policies for a variety of
reasons, including avoiding government scrutiny and heavy fines, preserving their
access to the U.S. financial market (and with it, U.S. currency), and minimizing the
reputational risks of being associated directly or indirectly with a U.S.-targeted actor.
They may cooperate for less material reasons as well, including out of a wave of
international support and empathy in the aftermath of terrorism, or out of professional
and social incentives that emerge from interacting with powerful U.S. officials.
To illustrate these harnessing tactics, this Article draws on three examples: Iran’s
nuclear program and its support of U.S.-designated terrorist groups, North Korea’s
nuclear proliferation policy, and intelligence collection by the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a Belgian-incorporated
telecommunication consortium of private banks. In the first two cases, the
government’s main goal has been to recruit foreign banks to help cut off the financial

6. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 311, 115 Stat. 272, 298 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2012)).
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pipeline to terrorists and nuclear proliferators. In the third case, the government
enlisted SWIFT officials to gain access to troves of financial data.
The government’s dollar unilateralism challenges the important assumption held
by many, though not all, international legal scholars that globalization has rendered
the need for multilateral cooperation among states more pressing than ever before.7
The increasing integration of the global economy, the rise of both licit and illicit
transnational networks, and profound technological change have, this view holds,
undermined the capacity of states to unilaterally regulate activity within their own
borders.8 The analysis here suggests instead that the U.S. government’s leveraging
of its central position in global financial markets is likely to persist.9
Indeed, as the United States confronts new national security challenges, dollar
unilateralism may well become routine policy. Treasury, as one journalist writes,
has become “Obama’s favorite noncombatant command.”10 The continued
availability of unilateralism as a policy option for the United States points to a need
to understand the conditions that influence its efficacy. This Article proposes three
such conditions: industry structure, policy acceptability, and bargaining asymmetry.
This Article also contends that the harnessing of foreign banks raises questions
about the government’s political accountability, both domestically and
internationally, that are generally overlooked by both domestic and international
law literatures. These accountability concerns vary according to context (domestic
or international) and the nature of the government’s legal tactic (formal or
informal). The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which oversees
Treasury’s policy on sanctions (broadly defined) is, as one national security expert
puts it, “probably one of the most powerful government agencies no one’s ever

7. See, e.g., Kevin J. Cloherty & Jill L. Brenner, Targeting Terror Dollars: Some
Lessons from the Drug War, 7 ANDREWS BANK & LENDER LIABILITY LIT. REP. 5 (2001);
Stewart Patrick, Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S.
Ambivalence, in MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT 1
(Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and
Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2004); Richard B.
Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer & Bryce Rudyk, Building Blocks for Global Climate
Protection, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 341 (2013); Brian Wilson, Submersibles and Transnational
Criminal Organizations, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 35, 46–47 (2011).
8. See, e.g., RICHARD O’BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF
GEOGRAPHY (1992); Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting: Where Internet Meets
Geography, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 266 (2000) (“[G]lobalization finds its strongest expression
in global capital markets.”); Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of
Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism?, 8 CONSTELLATIONS 442, 447 (2001).
9. For additional support, see, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, New Sanctions for a New Century:
Treasury’s Innovative Use of Financial Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 789, 790 (2009)
(“[S]everal innovative aspects of these sanctions . . . seem highly likely to be replicated in
the design of a wide range of future sanctions against other targets.”); David D. Aufhauser,
Terrorist Financing: The Privatization of Economic Sanctions, FED. LAW., Sept. 2009, at 22,
26 (stating that U.S. financial restrictions against Iran represent “a harbinger of future
models of conduct”); Baran Han, A Theory of Economic Sanctions 27 (Korea Inst. for Int’l
Econ. Policy, Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012).
10. David E. Sanger, Obama Policy Is Put to Test, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2014, at A1.
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heard of.”11 For some actors, this newfound power comes at a price. Even when
conservatively deployed, dollar unilateralism has unintended humanitarian
consequences. For instance, in response to the government’s use of financial
leverage, European banks have shut down many money-transfer businesses that
they identified as posing money-laundering risks. The reverberations of this
decision are felt acutely in Africa, where money transfers from the global diaspora
serve as “an economic lifeline” for millions of Africans.12 Forty percent of Somalis,
for instance, depend on such transfers.13
Part I introduces domestic and international law scholarship on the
government’s post-9/11 national security policies and highlights the recent shift in
government strategy. It underscores how this harnessing strategy differs from its
predecessors, and it poses the Article’s two central questions about how the
government is able to enlist the cooperation of foreign banks and why foreign
banks are willing to cooperate. Part II answers these questions, arguing that the
government has used three main tactics and that foreign banks have cooperated for
a set of diverse reasons. Part III suggests the conditions influencing the efficacy of
this new model of unilateralism and identifies emerging gaps in U.S.
accountability, both domestically and globally.
I. THE TURN TO FOREIGN BANKS AFTER 9/11
With a few exceptions, both domestic and international law scholars have
overlooked the government’s turn to dollar unilateralism.14 Domestic law scholars
have analyzed surveillance programs that depend on the cooperation of domestic
corporations. Many international law scholars have focused primarily on the
government’s reliance on international organizations and transgovernmental
networks and assumed this multilateralism to be increasingly necessary to fight
cross-border threats.15 Although a small group of international law scholars has
acknowledged the persistence of unilateralism and debated its normative value,
these scholars have generally overlooked this shift to a new form of unilateralism,
which leverages U.S. financial power.

11. Anna Yukhananov & Warren Strobel, After Success on Iran, U.S. Treasury’s Sanctions
Team Faces New Challenges, REUTERS, Apr. 14, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com
/article/2014/04/15/us-usa-sanctions-insight-idUSBREA3D1O820140415.
12. Let Them Remit, ECONOMIST (July 20, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news
/middle-east-and-africa/21581995-western-worries-about-money-laundering-are-threatening
-economic-lifeline.
13. Id.; see also EDWINA THOMPSON, ROBIN PLUMMER, KEITH SENTIS, MICHAEL
CATALANO, JOHN THOMPSON & TOM KEATINGE, BEECHWOOD INT’L, SAFER CORRIDORS:
RAPID ASSESSMENT (2013).
14. For exceptions, see Kittrie, supra note 9, at 815 n.119; PETER D. FEAVER & ERIC B.
LORBER, LEGATUM INSTITUTE, COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF
FINANCIAL SANCTIONS 27 (2010).
15. See infra Part I.A.
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A. Harnessing in Domestic and International Arenas
The United States has sought to curb cross-border threats by recruiting
domestic corporate actors and working with foreign governments bilaterally and
through international organizations and transgovernmental networks.
Domestically, the government—specifically the Executive16—has, among other
activities,17 enlisted private companies to collect intelligence.18 Warrantless
wiretapping (exposed in 2005),19 the “call-tracking program” (uncovered in
2006),20 PRISM (exposed in 2013),21 and Xkeyscore initiatives (revealed in
2013)22 are among the better-known examples of public-private surveillance
operations.23 But the Executive has also launched lower-profile intelligence
operations, relying on delivery services such as Federal Express (“FedEx”) to
access databases on international shipments,24 airlines to obtain passenger

16. This Article uses the term “Executive” to refer generally to the executive branch of
government, which includes Treasury but also encapsulates other agencies (e.g. the NSA).
17. Beyond its surveillance efforts, the government’s most salient use of private actors
in the post-9/11 period is its outsourcing security to private security contractors (PSCs) for
military interventions and covert antiterrorist operations. Although the government has long
used PSCs, its reliance on them after 9/11 reached unprecedented levels. Martha Minow,
Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability,
Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1003 (2005); see also LAURA A.
DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF
PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011); P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003). For a survey of PSC involvement in military
engagements, see Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic,
and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1018–40 (2004)
[hereinafter Michaels, Beyond Accountability].
18. In addition to relying on private companies for covert surveillance operations, the
government has made extensive use of commercial data brokers to collect information on
individuals, which is then analyzed by government officials. E.g., Etzioni, supra note 3, at
934–37; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 320. Private companies have also been heavily involved
in fusion centers, in which state agencies and law enforcement agencies at both the federal
and state level coordinate efforts to collect and analyze intelligence. Citron & Pasquale,
supra note 3, at 1449–50.
19. James Risen & Eric Lichtbau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
20. E.g., Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls; 3
Telecoms Help Government Collect Billions of Domestic Records, USA TODAY, May 11,
2006, at 1A.
21. E.g., Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 1.
22. E.g., Greenwald, supra note 2.
23. E.g., David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 62, 63–64 (2013).
24. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435,
1450, 1463–64 (2010) [hereinafter Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security]; Robert Block,
Private Eyes: In Terrorism Fight, Government Finds a Surprising Ally: FedEx, WALL ST. J.,
May 26, 2005, at A1.
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information,25 and U.S. financial institutions such as Bank of America26 to access
vast repositories of private financial data.27
Scholars have identified both functional and politically strategic reasons for the
government’s increased reliance on domestic firms. They suggest that private
companies are both cheaper and better positioned to collect intelligence on private
activities than government officials because companies interact more frequently
with the public and in ways that often require the sharing of private information.28
In terms of strategic benefits, private actors are legally and politically less
constrained than the government.29 By relying on such companies for intelligence,
the Executive can benefit from a weak regime regulating corporate privacy while
avoiding the political costs associated with “big brother” watchdog programs.30
As in the literature on privatization more generally,31 domestic law scholars
have raised concerns about executive aggrandizement and accountability.32 Some

25. E.g., Matthew L. Wald & John Schwartz, Screening Plans Went Beyond Terrorism,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, at N35; Secure Flight Compared to CAPPS II, ACLU (Mar. 29,
2005), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/secure-flight-compared-capps-ii; The Four
Biggest Problems with the “Secure Flight” Airline Security Program, ACLU (Mar. 24, 2005),
http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/four-biggest-problems-secure-flight-airline
-security-program.
26. ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 20–21 (2004), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs
/surveillance_report.pdf [hereinafter SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX].
27. See, e.g., LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS,
AND LIBERTY 164–65 (2008); David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to
War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1409–18 (2007).
28. Minow, supra note 17, at 1003–04; see also Donald G. Featherstun, D. Whitney
Thornton II & J. Gregory Correnti, State and Local Privatization: An Evolving Process, 30
PUB. CONT. L.J. 643, 648 (2001) (explaining the privatization of government functions more
generally); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1285, 1295 (2003) (same). By relying on private data gathering, the government
avoids the burden of intelligence gathering and focuses instead on analysis. SURVEILLANCE
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 2. By enlisting private contractors, the government
can also evade certain bureaucratic procedures such as the APA’s notice and comment
procedures, Michaels, Beyond Accountability, supra note 17, at 1038, and can select
contractors already trained in recent innovative technologies, rather than conducting the
training itself. Minow, supra note 17, at 1003–04.
29. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 908–09. The ACLU makes the same
point, but more bluntly: “[This strategy] allows the government to carry out privacy-invading
practices at ‘arm’s length’ . . . it could not carry out [such tasks] itself without serious legal or
political repercussions.” SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 2.
30. See, e.g., SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 29–31; Michaels,
All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 908–09.
31. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2001); Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,” Constitutional
Accountability, and Outsourcing Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1365–67 (2013).
32. Academic work on recent surveillance operations has focused on other
constitutional dimensions as well, including the constitutionality of government-corporate
data mining initiatives. For privacy rights generally, see Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of
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scholars have highlighted a “doctrinal vacuum,” noting that the Supreme Court has
never ruled on the status of the government’s Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP)
or its mining of data provided by third parties.33 Others have highlighted
institutional gaps.34 Surveillance programs like Xkeyscore, for instance, proceed
largely unchecked by Congress and the courts.35 The covertness of such programs
eliminates, for all practical purposes, the possibility of external monitoring.
Intelligence agencies do not carry the burden of justifying their programs to
outsiders and are not deterred by the possibility that their operations will be
subjected to some form of ex post political or judicial review.36
Scholars have devoted less attention to the question of precisely how the
Executive has secured the cooperation of domestic firms. Instead, most scholars
assume that the government’s legal authority over domestic firms makes law the
main force driving both the government’s harnessing strategy and corporate
participation.37 Reality is more complicated: even when the government has had
formal legal authority to compel corporate cooperation, it has often turned to more
informal tactics—what Jon Michaels labels as “handshake agreements”—to recruit
domestic firms.38 For instance, in contrast to the United States Postal Service and
United Parcel Service, FedEx cooperated with government requests to open
suspicious packages, even when the government lacked a search warrant. And
while definitive proof of a quid pro quo exchange is difficult to come by, the
government granted FedEx more government contracts after FedEx officials
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 489 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy].
For First Amendment rights specifically, see Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 170 (2007) [hereinafter Solove, The First
Amendment]; Strandburg, supra note 3, at 743–44. For Fourth Amendment rights, see, e.g.,
Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435, 451 (2008); Laura K. Donohue, Constitutional and Legal Challenges
to the Anti-Terrorist Finance Regime, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 661 (2008); Stephen E.
Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information,
Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2007).
33. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 483, 509–13 (2010); Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 575, 589–92 (2010) (“The fact that the Supreme Court has never clarified (and,
in fact, has consistently avoided clarifying) the precise legal status of intelligence continues
to be an obstacle for meaningful intelligence governance.”).
34. E.g., Kitrosser, supra note 33, at 503–04; Michaels, All the President's Spies, supra
note 3, at 922–26.
35. E.g., Greenwald, supra note 2; Paul Lewis, White House Unable to Confirm if
Congress Briefed on NSA Spy Program, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 31, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/white-house-congress-nsa-xkeyscore.
36. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 933. Scholars express similar
accountability concerns about the government’s increasing use of PSCs. Private security
contractors allow the Executive to bypass Congress since the traditional mechanisms of
congressional constraint—limiting access to military troops, setting disciplinary guidelines for
the use of force, and reducing the level of military funding—are less available. PSCs also make
monitoring more difficult. Michaels, Beyond Accountability, supra note 17, at 1063–74.
37. E.g., Cate, supra note 32; Donohue, supra note 32; Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy,
supra note 32. But see Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3; Michaels,
Deputizing Homeland Security, supra note 24.
38. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 904.
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cooperated and gave them special access to information about security threats.39
After 9/11, the Bush Administration also relied on persuasion tactics to elicit the
participation of Western Union, with former CIA Director George Tenet asking for
that company’s informal assistance: “What I’m asking is that you and your
company be patriots.”40
Does it matter whether the government uses its formal legal authority or other
forms of influence to elicit the cooperation of domestic companies? While
government surveillance raises concerns about executive accountability on its own,
such concerns are compounded when intelligence gathering proceeds through
informal rather than formal legal channels.41 As Jon Michaels argues, handshake
agreements free the government from legal and political constraints.42 When
approaching specific companies, the Executive does not, for instance, have to seek
congressional approval. There are fewer reporting requirements, fewer documents to
examine ex post, and thus less pressure on intelligence operatives to evaluate their
programs critically and proffer justifications for their existence.43 The Executive is
also under less pressure to justify its decisions to the American public.44
While domestic law scholars have focused on the government’s post-9/11
domestic security strategy, international law scholars have analyzed its reliance on
transnational governmental networks and international governmental
organizations.45 For instance, some scholars have explored U.S. engagement at the

39. Id. at 915–16 (noting that FedEx has gained special access to government security
databases, was granted a seat on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) regional
terrorism task force, and was awarded a license from Tennessee to use police powers to
investigate crimes and make arrests). By contrast, the telecommunications company Qwest
lost government contracts after it refused to cooperate with the government’s Call-Data
Program, under which other telecommunication companies transferred massive stores of
“envelope information” (or metadata) to the NSA. Id. at 912–13. There, the NSA allegedly
told Qwest officials that its refusal to hand over data might hurt its chances of getting
classified work from the government. Id. The former CEO of Qwest further claims that his
prosecution for insider trading, resulting in four years in prison was in retaliation for his
refusal to cooperate. Dionne Searcey, Ex-CEO Exits Prison with a New Set of Pals, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 28, 2013, at A1.
40. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 914. This “just ask” strategy
appears to have been effective. For instance, a large number of airlines, including JetBlue,
Northwest, American Airlines, and United Airlines, have handed over troves of passenger
data to the government based on such informal requests. SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 10–11.
41. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 924–25.
42. See id. at 954.
43. See id. at 934.
44. SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 2.
45. E.g., John W. Head, Essay, What Has Not Changed Since September 11—The
Benefits of Multilateralism, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2002). International law scholars
have also focused heavily on U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly
the interventions’ legality and legitimacy. See generally Tawia Ansah, War: Rhetoric &
Norm-Creation in Response to Terror, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 797 (2003); Christopher
Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida,
and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7 (2003).
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U.N., where U.S. officials have worked both behind the scenes and publicly,
lobbying the Security Council and the General Assembly to adopt wholesale U.S.
sanctions against individuals, organizations, and states identified as national
security threats.46 Scholars have also examined U.S. policy at the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF), the main international organization that addresses money
laundering and terrorist financing, where U.S. officials have worked with foreign
officials to promote the implementation of anti–money laundering and
counterterrorist financing policies.47
Many, though not all, international law scholars have assumed this reliance
on multilateral institutions to be a necessity, not a choice.48 In a globalized era
marked by transnational criminal networks and the ability to move money
instantaneously across national borders, states, including the United States, can
no longer fight transnational security threats on their own.49 Now more than
ever, individuals or entities that seek to escape a government’s jurisdiction may
reroute or relocate illicit activity beyond a government’s reach, a phenomenon

46. In one prominent article, Jose Alvarez points to U.S. influence over the U.N.
Security Council’s counterterrorism policies and resolutions as a clear example of
“hegemonic law.” He writes, “No one has yet countered the suggestion, made by U.S.
government officials when the CTC [Counter-Terrorism Committee] was established, that it
was aimed at globally exporting U.S. counterterrorism legislation, particularly the U.S.
PATRIOT Act.” Jose E. Alvarez, Editorial Comment, Hegemonic International Law Revisited,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 875 (2003).
47. Much of this scholarship emphasizes the role of the United States in shaping FATF
policies. See, e.g., Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global
Governance and Offshore Financial Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 565–66 (2010); Ben
Hayes, Counter-Terrorism, “Policy Laundering,” and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance,
Regulating Civil Society, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Apr. 2012, at 5, 7.
48. I adopt the mainstream definition of multilateralism, which entails cooperation
among governments. See John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global
Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 381, 382 (2000). Cooperation between governments and
foreign private actors constitutes transnationalism. To be sure, scholars heralded the
necessity of multilateral cooperation to address cross-border threats long before 9/11. E.g.,
Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon Mandating a Unified
International Response, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 685, 709 (1999) (“Due to the global
nature of terrorism, States rely less frequently on exclusively unilateral policies toward
terrorism.”); Ernesto Samper Pizano, Colombia’s Commitment Toward a Global Agenda
Against Drugs, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 265, 269 (1997) (stating that
international cooperation, as opposed to unilateralism, is the “most adequate instrument” for
confronting global challenges); Fred C. Pedersen, Comment, Controlling International
Terrorism: An Analysis of Unilateral Force and Proposals for Multilateral Cooperation,
8 U. TOL. L. REV. 209 (1976) (discussing multilateral cooperation as a means to address
international terrorism). This view took on new force, however, after the terrorist attacks.
For a variety of views in the pre-9/11 period, both endorsing and criticizing unilateralism,
see Symposium, Unilateralism in International Law: A United States-European Symposium,
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2000).
49. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Bruce
Zagaris, The Merging of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financial
Enforcement Regimes After September 11, 2001, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 123 (2004).
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sometimes referred to as “leakage”50 or “crime displacement.”51 Governments
may act extraterritorially under only very limited conditions, which makes it
exceedingly difficult to detain or even track rogue actors and activity without
the cooperation of other states.52
This view of multilateral cooperation pervades both policy and scholarship
and spans diverse issue areas.53 Urging more multilateral cooperation to fight
drug trafficking, for instance, Deputy Director of the Global Maritime
Operational Threat Response Coordination Center at the Department of
Homeland Security Brian Wilson stated, “Successful pursuit of submersibles
requires multilateral collaboration because the operating environment is simply
too large for any nation to address individually.”54 Legal scholar Marshall
Lloyd echoed, “Drug trafficking, for example, presents a different kind of crisis
in light of the operations of criminal organizations. The impact of drug cartels
and other groups extends beyond the jurisdictional reach of any one nation or
organization.”55
Writing more generally about the limited ability of states to unilaterally impose
sanctions, scholars Anu Bradford and Omri Ben-Shahar explain:
In today’s integrated economy, unilateral sanctions are even less
likely to be successful than they were in the past, because Targets have
more opportunities to circumvent sanctions. . . . If the US refuses to
buy oil from Iraq, the import ban can hardly be effective if Iraq can
divert that forgone trade to third countries. Similarly, if the US
prohibits its firms from selling anything but essential medicines to Iran,

50. This term is used in the environmental literature. Jonathan Wiener, for instance,
highlights how unilateral action would likely drive companies to move their emissions
activity to unregulated areas. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits
of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967–70 (2007).
51. Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The
Political Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 VAND. L. REV. 795, 808–09 (2009).
52. It is widely accepted that states may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction based on
nationality (nationality jurisdiction). Much more controversially, a state may arguably assert
jurisdiction if its national security interests are affected (protective principle), if the conduct
violates a jus cogen norm (universal jurisdiction), or based on the nationality of a victim
(passive personality principle). For a discussion of these bases of jurisdiction see, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (1987); CEDRIC RYNGAERT,
JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–9 (2008).
53. For this point relating to transnational maritime crime, see Jon D. Peppetti, Building
the Global Maritime Security Network: A Multinational Legal Structure to Combat
Transnational Threats, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 73 (2008). For crime in tax law, see Stephen
Troiano, Current Development: The U.S. Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and the Impact on
Tax Havens, 17 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317 (2011).
54. Wilson, supra note 7, at 46.
55. Marshall B. Lloyd, Conflict, Intervention, and Drug Trafficking: Unintended
Consequences of United States Policy in Colombia, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 293, 296
(2011). Stacey Mathews noted about trafficking in children, “A multinational response with
international coordination of law enforcement is required to thwart the enormous problem of
trafficking.” Stacey Mathews, Comment, International Trafficking in Children: Will New
U.S. Legislation Provide an Ending to the Story?, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 649, 653 (2005).
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the measure is futile if other countries continue to supply Iran with
comparable products at a comparable price. In other words, unilateral
trade sanctions often only alter trade routes and capital flows without
affecting the total level of commerce.56
Scholars and policy makers have applied this observation to a range of
transnational challenges that go beyond the implementation of sanctions,57 such as
human trafficking58 and cross-border carbon emissions.59 Unilateralism is, in this
view, an inadequate response to transnational challenges. Foreign policy expert
Stewart Patrick put it this way: “[T]he choice is not between unilateralism and
multilateralism but among variants of the latter.”60
In contrast to this dominant view about the necessity of multilateralism, a
narrower strand of international law scholarship has recognized the persistence
of U.S. unilateralism to address cross-border security threats—most obviously
illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism, but also
corruption61 and human trafficking.62 The primary focus of this scholarship is
normative. While recognizing the need to assess unilateralism in its specific
context,63 most scholars have also suggested more general arguments favoring

56. Anu Bradford & Omri Ben-Shahar, Efficient Enforcement in International Law, 12
CHI. J. INT’L L. 375, 390 (2012) (citations omitted).
57. Cloherty & Brenner, supra note 7 (arguing that international cooperation is
imperative to fight terrorism).
58. Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Sex Slavery in the United States and the Law Enacted to Stop
It Here and Abroad, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 317, 336 (2005).
59. Laurence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
71, 98–99 (2008).
60. Patrick, supra note 7, at 2.
61. See, e.g., William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral
Enforcement, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 360 (2013).
62. See, e.g., Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral
Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437 (2006). Other scholars
have written about the use of unilateralism more generally, by countries other than the
United States, e.g., Hakimi, supra note 5; Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International
Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014), and for a range of
transnational challenges including climate change, trade, and human rights. E.g., Rachel
Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International Trade Law at the WTO, 30 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 1133 (2009); Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic
Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2001); Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the
International Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 33 (2002); Thihan Myo Nyun, Feeling Good or Doing Good: Inefficacy of
the U.S. Unilateral Sanctions Against the Military Government of Burma/Myanmar, 7
WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 455 (2008); Gregory Shaffer & Daniel Bodansky,
Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 31 (2012).
63. See Jose E. Alvarez, Multilateralism and Its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 393,
403 (2000) [hereinafter Alvarez, Multilateralism and its Discontents] (“The question—is
unilateralism or multilateralism a good thing?—cannot be answered in the abstract.”);
Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 62, at 41 (“The impact of unilateral action ultimately
depends on whether it is persuasive in shaping norms of behavior.”); see also Cleveland,
supra note 62, at 7 (discussing the possible efficacy of unilateralism in advancing human
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or denouncing its use. Some scholars have underscored the role of unilateralism
in helping to enforce or generate international law.64 Others have emphasized
its efficacy in certain issue areas, such as promoting the development and
internalization of human rights norms,65 stemming climate change,66 or fighting
human trafficking.67 A number of scholars have criticized unilateralism as a
function of domestic politics and argued that it undermines rather than
reinforces multilateral institutions.68 Still others have criticized the use of
unilateralism for specific issues, such as battling corruption,69 as well as drug
and human trafficking.70
Mirroring the tendencies of domestic law scholarship, these normative analyses
generally overlook questions about how a government proceeds unilaterally—the
precise tactics it uses.71 This silence is problematic partly because it leaves
unanswered questions by those who suggest unilateralism is becoming obsolete
about how the government is able to surmount displacement and leakage barriers. It
is also troubling for another reason: by disregarding the process of unilateralism,
international legal scholars have failed to recognize the government’s profound
shift in individual tactics and overall strategy to address cross-border threats,
leaving their normative assessments, at best, incomplete.

rights); Hakimi, supra note 5 (discussing how in some conditions unilateral action is
preferable to multilateral action).
64. E.g., Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming
2015); Hakimi, supra note 5, at 107.
65. See Cleveland, supra note 62, at 31–48. But see Nyun, supra note 62.
66. E.g., Joanne Scott & Lavanya Rajamani, EU Climate Change Unilateralism, 23
EUR. J. INT’L L. 469 (2012); Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 62, at 38 (defending
unilateralism on the ground that “relying on formal treaty negotiations may be too little too
late to prevent dangerous climate change”).
67. E.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation: The Complex
Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 1143, 1147 (2003) (“‘Multilateral conventions’ lowest common denominator
‘solutions’ [may] prove less efficacious than a hegemon’s concerted efforts to enforce
extraterritorially its own domestic law to the same ends.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Jose Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 316 (1998)).
68. E.g., Danchin, supra note 62, at 109–13.
69. Magnuson, supra note 61, at 411–17 (stating that unilateralism has led to biased
enforcement, overenforcement, and increased levels of instability).
70. E.g., Chuang, supra note 62; Lloyd, supra note 55; Monica Serrano, Unilateralism,
Multilateralism, and U.S. Drug Diplomacy in Latin America, in UNILATERALISM AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 117 (David M. Malone & Yuen Foong
Khong eds., 2003).
71. For exceptions, see James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 87 (2014) (discussing how the United States has used unilateralism as a
mechanism for pressuring or inspiring other countries to change their own regulations and
policies or as a stepping stone toward multilateral treaties); see also Krisch, supra note 62;
Magnuson, supra note 61; Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 62, at 34–35 (discussing how
U.S. unilateral actions spurred multilateral action).
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B. The Turn to Foreign Banks
The government’s policy of harnessing foreign banks serves two core goals:
cutting off the financial pipeline72 and “following the money trail.”73 To achieve
these interrelated objectives, the government has exploited its financial leverage to
pressure and persuade foreign banks to cut their business ties with targeted actors
and hand over financial intelligence.
This strategy is new. Although the government has a long history of using
economic statecraft such as trade embargoes, agency designations, and export
controls to pursue its security interests,74 it has never adopted the finance-based
strategy it is now using.75 Traditionally, the government’s use of economic
statecraft has been characterized by two features: the core purpose of prohibiting
“U.S. persons”76 from engaging in transactions with the targeted country, and the

72. See An Assessment of the Tools Needed to Fight the Financing of Terrorism: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 17 (2002) [hereinafter Assessment of the
Tools] (statement of David D. Aufhauser, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury)
(discussing “the importance of the war campaign against terrorist financing”).
73. “Specifically, ‘[o]ur objective is . . . to follow the money trail, and dismantle entire
financial networks and channels from moving money to finance terror.’” Daryl Shetterly,
Starving the Terrorists of Funding: How the United States Treasury Is Fighting the War on
Terror, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 327, 327 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Financial
War on Terrorism: New Money Trails Present Fresh Challenges: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong. 5 (2002)).
74. For a brief synopsis of this history, see Peter L. Fitzgerald, “If Property Rights Were
Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away with This”: Blacklisting and Due
Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 88–110 (1999)
[hereinafter Fitzgerald, Property Rights]. For a comprehensive description of U.S. use of
embargoes and blacklists before 1998, see id. at 90–97; see also Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre
Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online].
75. In contrast to its current strategy, the U.S. government, like other governments, has
previously used its financial leverage over foreign banks for more traditional financial
reasons. For instance, it has conditioned financial market access to ensure financial
soundness and stability of foreign banks. Other governments also use their market (though
not financial) leverage over foreign firms for a range of more traditional regulatory goals.
The European Union, for instance, uses its market leverage and regulatory capacity, along
with other features, to shape unilaterally foreign rules regulating issues ranging from
antitrust to public health. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012).
76. The government’s definition of “U.S. persons” includes foreign branches. Jeffrey A.
Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905, 925 (2009)
(“‘United States person’ [includes] ‘any United States citizen, permanent resident alien,
entity organized under the law of the United States (including foreign branches), [and] any
person in the United States.’”) (citing Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 789 (2002)). In
the exceptional cases of Cuba and North Korea, Treasury has defined U.S. persons to include
foreign incorporated companies that are owned or controlled by U.S. persons. Harry L.
Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA.
J. INT’L ECON. L. 61, 65 (1999); see also Meyer, supra, at 925 n.62. For an analysis of U.S.
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction (by some definitions) through the regulation of U.S.
parent-foreign subsidiary relationships, see Terrence J. Lau, Triggering Parent Company
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government’s reliance on general U.S. market power, particularly in international
trade.77 To ensure that U.S. persons do not use foreign entities to circumvent such
embargoes, the government began to employ agency lists, such as Treasury’s
Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List78 or the State Department’s Debarred
List.79 These lists target foreign actors as essentially “corporate cloaks” and
prohibit U.S. entities from conducting business with them.80 Beginning in the
mid-1990s, the government—by executive order and congressional legislation—
began to expand the purpose of these lists to create non-country-based programs
targeting alleged terrorists and drug traffickers.81
The government has also used export controls, which restrict outgoing trade based
on the identity of participating parties and the nature of the product.82 Mirroring its
Liability Under United States Sanctions Regimes: The Troubling Implications of Prohibiting
Approval and Facilitation, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 413 (2004).
77. For instance, the government has applied blanket trade embargoes on countries such
as Angola, China, and Cuba. Fitzgerald, Property Rights, supra note 74, at 90–97.
78. This is an integrated list, currently 591 pages, containing more than 20,000 named
individuals and companies that the government has deemed as posing some form of a threat
to U.S. security. The list covers alleged terrorists, drug traffickers and WMD traffickers.
Changes to the list are published in the Federal Register and in the form of email updates
from the Department of the Treasury. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS LIST (2014),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdn.pdf [hereinafter SDN LIST].
79. This list contains the names of individuals and entities that have violated arms
export control sanctions and are prohibited from exporting defense articles (including
technical data) and defense services. See DIRECTORATE OF DEF. TRADE CONTROLS, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS—LIST OF STATUTORILY DEBARRED PARTIES JULY 1988–
NOVEMBER 2013 (2013), available at http://pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/documents/debar.pdf.
80. Fitzgerald, Property Rights, supra note 74, at 87. The government also freezes or
blocks the entity’s property via OFAC. See Frequently Asked Questions and Answers Page 1,
U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs
/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#18 (“Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally
prohibited from dealing with them.”).
81. The first of these lists was established by a 1995 executive order directing the Treasury
to target Colombian drug cartels. Peter L. Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins and Blacklists: Compliance
Issues with US Economic Sanctions, 4 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 360, 365 (2001)
[hereinafter Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins]. Three days later, OFAC created the Specially
Designated Narcotics Trafficker Program (SDNT). See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IMPACT REPORT: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST COLOMBIAN
DRUG CARTELS 1 (2007). Other noncountry lists created between the mid-1990s and 2000
targeted Middle East terrorists (beginning in 1995), governments that support terrorism
(beginning in 1996), foreign terrorist organizations (beginning in 1997), traffickers in WMD
(beginning in 1998), and narcotics traffickers (beginning in 2000). Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins,
supra, at 362.
82. Although export controls initially applied only to items being exported from the
United States, the government has since extended them to U.S. nationals on foreign territory.
This occurred with the enactment of the 1979 Export Administration Act. Gregory W.
Bowman, A Prescription for Curing U.S. Export Controls, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 599, 611–14;
Larry E. Christensen, Unmasking the Myths, TRADE & FORFAITING REV., Mar. 2008, at 44,
44–45 (2008). The Commerce Control List (CCL) includes items controlled for export or
re-export by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) subject to the export licensing
authority of the BIS. 15 C.F.R. § 774 (2014).
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use of agency lists to prevent U.S. persons from evading trade embargoes, the
government has employed these lists to prohibit the exports of U.S. products from a
non-U.S. country to a targeted country or entity—a policy known as “re-export
controls.”83
In a few rare but salient instances, the United States has tried to use these
traditional economic tools with the primary purpose of influencing foreign private
actors rather than U.S. persons. Each of these attempts to disrupt foreign
transactions has largely failed. In the 1982 “pipeline case,”84 for example, former
President Ronald Reagan attempted to prohibit European subsidiaries of U.S. firms
from supplying oil and gas equipment and technology to the Soviet Union as well as
to prohibit non-U.S. firms and subsidiaries, which were using U.S.-licensed
technology, from exporting equipment or technologies to Russia.85 European
governments protested vehemently, and U.S.-European relations quickly
deteriorated.86 Using General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev’s death as pretext, Reagan
retreated and lifted the re-export controls eleven months after he had first imposed
them.87
In 1996, Congress enacted two pieces of legislation that similarly tried to
influence the business calculus of foreign firms, albeit by different enforcement
strategies. Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act, better known as the Helms-Burton Act.88 This legislation aims

83. For a brief summary of re-export regimes for Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and
North Korea, see Clark, supra note 76, at 68–71. If a foreign party is found to have violated
such a restriction, and even if the government cannot prosecute the foreign actor for lack of
personal jurisdiction, it can still impose penalties either by placing the party on an agency
list, which involves some form of market exclusion, or by holding—where possible—the
U.S. parent company liable for the conduct of its foreign subsidiaries. John P. Barker &
Michael E. Ginsberg, Managing Compliance with U.S. Treasury Department OFAC
Obligations: Even if Your Business Is Exclusively Outside the U.S., 5 GLOBAL TRADE
& CUSTOMS J. 183, 184 (2010); see also Clark, supra note 76, at 71–72 (discussing the case
of Fruehauf France).
84. See generally BRUCE W. JENTLESON, PIPELINE POLITICS: THE COMPLEX POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF EAST-WEST ENERGY TRADE (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1986).
85. William S. Dodge, The Helms-Burton Act and Transnational Legal Process, 20
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 713, 721–22 (1997); see also Amendment of Oil and Gas
Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (June 24, 1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts.
376, 379, 385); Reexport of technical data and exports of the product manufactured abroad by use
of U.S. technical data, 47 Fed. Reg. 27,251 (June 24, 1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 379.8).
86. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterritorial
Trade Controls, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 117, 121; Homer E. Moyer, Jr.
& Linda A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal
Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 109–10
(1983). For more extensive analysis of the pipeline case, see JENTLESON, supra note 84.
87. Dodge, supra note 85, at 722; see also Bowman, supra note 82, at 638–39;
Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online, supra note 74, at 70 n.320, 74 n.338.
88. The Helms-Burton Act was passed after Cuba shot down two unarmed airplanes flown
by anti-Castro activists. Clark, supra note 76, at 72–73. This Act built on a 1992 law that
prohibited foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba. Id. For a concise
discussion of these two pieces of legislation, see id. at 72–77.
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exclusively at influencing foreign actors, as the government had already adopted an
embargo prohibiting U.S. citizens and firms from doing business with Cuba.89 Most
controversially, the statute establishes a cause of action for any U.S. national against
foreign individuals or entities deemed to be “trafficking” in U.S. property confiscated
by Cuba after 1959, when Cuba first nationalized U.S.-owned firms (Title III), and it
prohibits any alleged trafficker from entering the United States (Title IV).90
Less than five months later, Congress tried a slightly different legislative
approach to shaping the business decisions of foreign firms. The Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act91 (later renamed the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)) penalizes any foreign
person or entity that invests more than twenty or forty million dollars in a given
year in the energy sectors of Iran and Libya respectively.92 Rather than rely on
judicial enforcement as with Helms-Burton, the ISA requires the President to
impose two of six possible sanctions on foreign entities that breach the treaty,
limiting their access to the U.S. trade market.93
Foreign governments were outraged by both statutes. They filed diplomatic
protests and legal claims against the United States at the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and adopted blocking statutes directing domestic companies to disregard
the U.S. statutes.94 In response, the United States, while keeping the statutes
formally on the books, retreated, and has refrained from enforcing either one.95

89. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6010 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 515
(2014). The Cuba embargo was initially implemented in 1962 as a response to Cuba’s illegal
nationalization of U.S. property in Cuba. Cedric Ryngaert, Extraterritorial Export Controls
(Secondary Boycotts), 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 625, 636 (2008). In 1993, the United States expanded
the embargo, prohibiting almost all property transactions by U.S. persons with Cuba. Id.
90. In fact, Helms-Burton goes even further, preventing the officers and shareholders of
corporations that trafficked in the confiscated property from entering the United States. Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 401(a)(3), 110 Stat.
785, 822 (1996) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6091 (2012)). The Act even prevents
family members of those individuals from entering the United States. Id. § 401(a)(4).
91. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)).
92. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) sought to limit Libya’s and Iran’s ability
to finance the development of nuclear weapons programs or support terrorism and to
pressure Libya into extraditing two suspects involved in the 1988 Lockerbie bombing.
Ryngaert, supra note 89, at 639.
93. These sanctions include the following: denial of licenses to export products to a
sanctioned party; denial of Export-Import Bank assistance regarding exports to a sanctioned
party; for U.S. banks, prohibition of loans of more than $10 million to a sanctioned party;
debarment of sanctioned parties from U.S. government contracts; import restrictions; and,
for foreign financial institutions, denial of certain U.S. government banking privileges. Iran
& Libya Sanctions Act § 6, 110 Stat. 1541, 1545.
94. Ryngaert, supra note 89, at 646–47.
95. The United States has not enforced Title III of the Act. Id. at 648 (noting that
waivers for Title III have been continuously granted on a six-month basis and that Title IV
has been enforced against only a few companies); see also KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 25 (2014) [hereinafter KATZMAN, IRAN
SANCTIONS 2014] (“No country has been designated a ‘Country of Diversion Concern’
[under Title III].”); Clark, supra note 76, at 91–92.
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Since the 9/11 attacks, the government’s strategy of influencing foreign private
actors has undergone a profound shift. With the ultimate goal of isolating actors
identified as national security threats, the government has begun to exploit its
central position in global finance to induce foreign banks to follow U.S. security
policy.96 The government’s shift in focus from restricting trade to emphasizing
finance stems partly from its new understanding that the financial pipeline is a
lifeline for terrorist activities and an “audit trail” for identifying terrorist
networks.97 In his statement to Congress in 2002, Department of the Treasury
General Counsel David Aufhauser summarized the underlying logic of a policy that
aimed at cutting the financial pipeline to terrorists: “You can stop the killing if you
can stop the flow of money.”98 Explaining how tracking terrorist finance is more
effective than conventional intelligence gathering, Aufhauser elaborated, “[B]ooks
and records that are not intended for public oversight to [sic] do not lie; they are
literally the diaries of the enterprise of terror.”99 He continued, “That is kind of a
melodramatic statement, but I don’t actually think it is possible to overstate the
importance of the war campaign against terrorist financing.”100 In June 2005,
President George W. Bush signed an executive order extending the dual focus on
tracking and stopping money to counter the proliferation of WMD.101 The Obama
Administration has continued this two-prong policy.
Why would the government turn to foreign banks to cut off financial pipelines
rather than simply rely on domestic banks or foreign governments? Sanctioning only
the transactions of domestic banks likely would not suffice. Even if the United States
and the European Union were to coordinate cutting their ties with a designated entity, a
steady stream of finance and trade from other countries would likely fill the gap.102 In
this respect, traditional domestic sanctions are inevitably self-undermining.103

96. The key difference between the government’s past and current strategies is that the
past strategy exercised general market power while the current strategy exercises financial
power. See infra Part II.
97. Assessment of the Tools, supra note 72, at 17. Prior to the attacks, the Bush
Administration had resisted calls for more banking regulations; its position shifted overnight.
See Jesse S. Morgan, Dirty Names, Dangerous Money: Alleged Unilateralism in U.S. Policy
on Money Laundering, BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 771, 771–72 (2003).
98. Assessment of the Tools, supra note 72, at 17. Treasury asserted, “[W]e also
recognize that the fight against money laundering is integral to the war against terrorism, and
that effective anti-money-laundering practices will save innocent lives.” Peter Shields, When
the ‘Information Revolution’ and the U.S. Security State Collide: Money Laundering and the
Proliferation of Surveillance, 7 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 483, 484–85 (2005).
99. Assessment of the Tools, supra note 72, at 17. Others have described the task of
tracking terrorist financing less optimistically. Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee
Max Baucus describes the problem as “looking for a needle in a pile of needles.” Shetterly,
supra note 73, at 328.
100. Assessment of the Tools, supra note 72, at 17.
101. Exec. Order No. 13,382, 3 C.F.R. § 170 (2005). For an extensive discussion of the
origins, structure, and application of Executive Order 13,382, see CarrieLyn Donigan
Guymon, The Best Tool for the Job: The U.S. Campaign to Freeze Assets of Proliferators
and Their Supporters, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 849, 852–82 (2009).
102. Bradford & Ben-Shahar, supra note 56, at 389–90.
103. See Bryan R. Early, Alliances and Trade with Sanctioned States: A Study of U.S.
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In theory, multilateral cooperation holds more promise than domestic action for
placing sustained economic pressure on designated entities.104 But for the same
reasons that purely domestic sanctions are inadequate, multilateral agreements on
sanctions tend to be elusive. This elusiveness is partly due to China’s and Russia’s
veto power.105 Even when the Security Council adopts resolutions, other
governments may refrain from enforcing U.N. sanctions for strategic or political
reasons or for sheer lack of capacity.106 Legal scholar Jeffrey A. Meyer summarizes
the shortcomings of the domestic and multilateral options succinctly: “U.N.
sanctions are increasingly difficult to achieve and enforce, while unilateral
sanctions are of diminishing effectiveness because of the capacity and willingness
of third countries to do business with those that the United States shuns.”107
The limitations of domestic and multilateral approaches apply also to U.S.
attempts to follow illicit financial trails. If the U.S. government were to rely
exclusively on domestic banks for its financial intelligence, it might not be able to
track foreign transactions effectively. Designated actors, suspecting the limited
reach of the United States in surveillance operations, could move their transactions
to non-U.S. institutions. Relying on multilateral cooperation for intelligence is
therefore important.108 On its own, however, multilateralism too is inadequate:
governments may be reluctant to hand over intelligence for political reasons, or
they may simply move too slowly.109
The new strategy of dollar unilateralism responds to these limitations. It targets
foreign banks, which have the potential to bridge the gap between domestic and
multilateral approaches: harnessing foreign banks prevents designated actors from
easily finding new sponsors or new venues for their illicit activities. Moreover,
with the cooperation of foreign banks, the United States is less dependent on the
cooperation of foreign governments and multilateral organizations. In theory at
least, a Russian or Chinese veto of U.N. sanctions is a moot point if foreign
banks—including those in Russia and China—are implementing U.S. policy.
The government may be drawn to foreign banks for other reasons. Foreign
banks offer the same advantages as domestic private actors: better access to private
information and reduced costs of enforcement.110 They can also help limit access to
both U.S. and foreign markets and, thus, to the global economy. Furthermore, as
Economic Sanctions, 1950–2000, 56 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 547, 553 (2012).
104. See generally Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and
Combating the Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of
Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 137 (2011);
Meyer, supra note 76.
105. See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, U.S. Sees Window to Pressure Iran on
Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at A1; see also Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, Stalemate:
A Short History of Sanctions Against Iran, PEACE POL’Y, Jan. 26, 2010, at 4, available at
http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2010/01/26/stalemate-a-short-history-of-sanctions-against-iran.
106. See Eric Rosand, Current Developments: The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor
the Implementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 745, 760 (2004).
107. Meyer, supra note 76, at 924.
108. But see Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, 54 WORLD
POL. 373, 387 (2002) (discussing the ease by which targeted sanctions can be circumvented).
109. Robin Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at MM29 [hereinafter
Wright, Stuart Levey’s War].
110. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30.
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revolving doors to international commerce and capital, foreign banks provide a vast
repository of international financial information that U.S. banks may lack.
II. THE TACTICS OF DOLLAR UNILATERALISM
To implement dollar unilateralism, the government has deployed three
innovative, overlapping tactics: financial sticks, high-profile blacklists, and direct
diplomacy.111 The core purpose of each tactic is to influence foreign banks that
have ties to the targeted actor, rather than to directly influence the target itself.112
These tactics fall along a continuum of legal formality, both in their source of
authority (whether or not the government’s tactics are precisely enumerated) and
content (whether or not the government’s tactics impose binding obligations).
The government’s first tactic, and its most direct exercise of financial power, is
to wield financial sticks as a way to influence foreign banks to cut ties with targeted
actors. Financial sticks are formal in both source and content: they are explicitly
established by statute, executive order, or agency regulation, and they impose
legally binding requirements on actors under U.S. jurisdiction. Although these
sticks come in numerous forms—typically referred to by the summary concept of
sanctions113—the primary one entails restricting or denying foreign banks’ access to
the U.S. financial market if the banks continue to do business with targeted actors.114
Second, the government, specifically Treasury, uses high-profile blacklists to
pressure foreign banks, including those without U.S. ties, to limit business with
targeted entities. As defined in this Article, high-profile blacklists entail the simple
act of naming—in a highly publicized way—targeted financial entities and
jurisdictions without any follow-up action. Treasury, more specifically the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), uses high-profile blacklists as
the first step of a section 311 action under the Patriot Act. It issues a formal
regulatory finding and notice of proposed rulemaking warning that an entity

111. I adopt W. Michael Reisman and Monica Hakimi’s definition of “unilateralism” as
acting outside formal legal processes, without the structured oversight of any external actor.
See Hakimi, supra note 5, at 111 (citing Reisman, supra note 5, at 3). As Hakimi elaborates,
“The legal system’s formal processes are typically structured so that multiple states consent
to or oversee a decision.” Id.
112. See, e.g., Simon Tisdall, U.S. Financial Squeeze on Iran Yields Results, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Feb. 12, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/feb/13/tisdallbriefing
.world (“Where direct U.S. regulatory enforcement is impossible, as with European
businesses trading with Iran, American political, diplomatic and other pressures are proving
to be almost equally effective.”).
113. This Article avoids the terminology of “sanctions,” since it tends to obscure
differences among various types of sanctions and also creates terminological confusion. For
instance, some scholars and policy makers would claim that the denial of correspondent
banking to a third-party firm is not a sanction at all, but simply a regulatory condition that
foreign parties can choose to follow or ignore. Other scholars and policy makers refer to
correspondent banking restrictions using diverse terms including sanctions, sectoral
sanctions, secondary sanctions, and triadic sanctions.
114. To be sure, the government frequently conditions access to the U.S. financial market
(or uses some other financial stick) based on financial policies, such as ensuring adequate
capitalization. It has not done so in pursuit of national security.
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constitutes a “primary money laundering concern,” but does not require U.S. actors
to take any action. High-profile blacklists are thus semiformal given their
delineation under the Patriot Act but nonbinding nature. After it blacklists an entity,
Treasury may proceed to the second step and adopt a final rule that directs U.S.
banks to take certain “special measures,” such as closing correspondent accounts
with the listed entity. Even when Treasury officials refrain from using such
financial sticks at the second step, they anticipate that the simple act of naming an
entity may encourage foreign banks to cut their ties.115 Foreign banks may do so to
protect their market access (in case the government eventually imposes legal
measures) and to preserve their reputations.116
Finally, Treasury officials have turned to what appears to have been an
unprecedented campaign of “direct diplomacy,” systematically holding meetings
directly with foreign bank executives in addition to their meetings with foreign
government officials. Direct diplomacy covers a broad range of practices: traveling
abroad, sharing information, applying implicit pressure, using moral suasion, and
appealing to professional or social identities. This tactic is legally informal because
it is not explicitly enumerated by statute or executive order and does not impose
direct legal obligations on participants.117
The United States is able to deploy these three tactics because it is at the center
of global financial markets. As the world’s leading reserve currency,118 the dollar
accounts for more than sixty percent of the reserves of foreign central banks.119 The
dollar is the most important international reference currency, and it is in high
demand for stabilizing national currencies.120 Moreover, the dollar is the leading
currency of cross-border exchange, including foreign trade, foreign-exchange
trading, and international bond transactions.121 Importantly, the Federal Reserve
clears all transactions in U.S. dollars. This means that if they do not have offices in
the United States, foreign banks will usually hold correspondent or payable-through
accounts with U.S. banks in order to preserve their access to U.S. currency.122

115. See infra text accompanying notes 199–203.
116. I follow the literature in this area in conceptualizing reputational concerns as market
based, without denying the possibility that sociocultural and professional aspects of
reputation may also be in play. See, e.g., Judith van Erp, Naming and Shaming in Regulatory
Enforcement, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 322, 323
(Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2012) (describing three aspects of firm
reputation that motivate compliance).
117. See Exec. Order No. 13,382, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 172 (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7,
3 C.F.R. 789 (2002).
118. JUAN C. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL
WARFARE 424 (2013) [hereinafter ZARATE, TREASURY'S WAR] (“This [financial] power relies
on . . . the centrality of the United States as a financial center, and maintenance of the dollar
as the world’s preferred reserve currency.”); see also BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT
PRIVILEGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE DOLLAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM (2011).
119. Alan Wheatley, Introduction to THE POWER OF CURRENCIES AND CURRENCIES OF
POWER 11–12 (Alan Wheatley ed., 2013) [hereinafter POWER OF CURRENCIES].
120. See id. at 10.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Foreign banks establish correspondent accounts with U.S. banks so that the U.S.
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The dominance of U.S. currency gives the U.S. government “the power to
persuade and coerce.”123 At any moment, the government can choose to cut off a
foreign bank’s access to U.S. financial markets and thus push it to the periphery of
global trade and finance.124 The government does so either by suspending a foreign
bank’s license to operate in the United States or by directing U.S. banks to shut
down their correspondent and payable-through accounts for the foreign bank. This
is, in effect, a death penalty for foreign banks. As David Cohen, Treasury’s Under
Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, explains,
For banks and businesses around the world, if they don’t have access to
the U.S. financial system, don’t have access to the U.S. economy, it is a
significant if not mortal wound. That gives us a huge amount of
leverage, a huge amount of opportunity to project U.S. power through
our financial measures.125
Foreign banks have been responsive to the government’s dollar unilateralism.
They appear to have cooperated for a mix of reasons: to preserve access to the U.S.
financial market, to protect their reputations within the international banking
industry, and to defend social and professional norms. This is not to deny the
existence of important exceptions; these harnessing tactics do not work all the time.
The analysis below suggests both how the government succeeds in enlisting the
cooperation of foreign banks and how such tactics can at times be derailed.
In exploring dollar unilateralism, this Part draws on three cases. It first describes
the government’s use of financial sticks to indirectly (through regulating U.S.
banks) pressure foreign banks to cut their ties to Iran. It then discusses how the
government has attempted to discourage foreign bank transactions with North
Korea by employing high-profile blacklists. And finally, it details the government’s
reliance on direct diplomacy for intelligence gathering and securing foreign banks’
cooperation with U.S. policies, drawing respectively on the examples of SWIFT
and Iran. The discussion concludes with a brief consideration of whether these
tactics have proven effective.

bank may act on their behalf, receiving deposits from the foreign bank, making payments,
and engaging in other financial transactions. Foreign banks establish payable-through
accounts at U.S. banks in order to grant their foreign customers access to the U.S. banking
system. Barry E. Carter & Ryan M. Farha, Overview and Operation of U.S. Financial
Sanctions, Including the Example of Iran, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 903, 906 n.20 (2013). For
further explanations of correspondent and payable-through banking, see 31 U.S.C.
§ 5318A(b) (2012); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Fact Sheet: Overview of Section
311 of the USA Patriot Act (May 22, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press
-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1591.aspx.
123. Alan Wheatley, The Origins and Use of Currency Power, in THE POWER OF
CURRENCIES AND CURRENCIES OF POWER 17, 19 (Alan Wheatley ed., 2013).
124. Id. at 11.
125. William Mauldin, U.S. Treasury’s Top Terrorism Cop: How Financial Tools Fight
Foes, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2014, 7:06 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/06/02/u-s
-treasurys-top-terrorism-cop-how-financial-tools-fight-foes.
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A. Financial Sticks
Using its financial leverage, the United States is able to convince foreign banks
to limit or cut ties with designated actors.126 It does this primarily by requiring U.S.
banks to limit or close accounts with foreign banks that do not adhere to U.S.
policy. This financial stick is powerful in that, even when the U.S. lacks
adjudicative jurisdiction over a foreign party, the government is able to penalize the
foreign party through directing U.S. companies to refrain from engaging in
business with it.127
The financial-sticks tactic is exemplified by the American efforts to isolate Iran.
Since the mid-1990s, the government has sought to stop Iran’s development of its
nuclear program and its support of terrorist groups.128 Following the 2005 election
of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the announcement that Iran was resuming
its uranium enrichment and conversion program, the United States stepped up its
policy of isolation.129 As part of this initiative, the government deployed three types
of financial sticks: refusing to clear transactions in U.S. dollars, cutting off access
to the U.S. financial market, and imposing financial penalties on foreign banks that
violate U.S. rules.

126. Although not discussed here, the government uses financial sticks as a tactic to
follow financial trails as well. For instance, under the Patriot Act, the U.S. government may
require a foreign bank with a correspondent account in the United States to hand over
financial data located abroad. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 311, 115 Stat. 272, 298 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A
(2012)). If the foreign bank refuses, the government can require U.S. banks to close its
correspondent accounts for the foreign bank. See id.; see also BENN STEIL & ROBERT E.
LITAN, FINANCIAL STATECRAFT: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY (2008) (discussing targeted financial measures to curb Iran’s and North Korea’s
nuclear programs).
127. The government’s reliance on such agency measures (sometimes called
administrative sanctions) is longstanding in the area of trade and has been a powerful tool.
As Peter L. Fitzgerald explains, “If the parties to an unapproved re-export are unaffiliated
with the United States and therefore beyond U.S. jurisdiction for enforcement purposes, the
re-export provision nevertheless provides a basis for the United States to assert that a
violation of its controls has occurred. It can then proceed to administratively sanction those
involved with the violation by naming them to the State Department’s Debarred List or the
Commerce Department’s DPL, even though they are otherwise beyond the reach of other
U.S. enforcement processes.” Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online, supra note 74, at 43.
Treasury’s employment of such measures in the financial (as opposed to trade) sector,
however, is new—at least as a national security strategy.
128. See generally Quinton Cannon Farrar, Comment, U.S. Energy Sanctions and the
Race to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
2347, 2353–64 (2011).
129. Rachel L. Loeffler, Bank Shots: How the Financial System Can Isolate Rogues,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2009, at 101, 105. Both Congress and the U.N., for instance, were
beginning to adopt more aggressive policies toward Iran. Two weeks after the first Treasury
designation of an Iranian bank, Congress adopted the Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. No.
109-293, 120 Stat. 1344 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)), which amended a
previous statute to include sanctions for supporting Iran’s WMD program.
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The government’s first financial stick in the context of its Iran policy was
relatively modest and involved the ad hoc withdrawal and eventually full retraction
of U-turn exemptions involving Iranian banks. U-turn payments occur when U.S.
banks clear transactions between foreign banks, converting foreign currency into
U.S. currency.130 In 1995, OFAC established a U-turn exemption to the Iran
embargo, which allowed U.S. banks to process transactions for Iranian entities as
long as U.S. banks did not directly credit or debit an Iranian account.131 U.S.
officials had decided to permit U-turn payments in order to maintain the primacy of
U.S. currency in the global oil market.132 Without such an exemption, they feared that
parties might shift to a different currency rather than limit their transactions with
Iran.133
In 2006, Treasury began to prohibit U.S. banks from performing U-turn
transactions that involved specific Iranian banks. Under the leadership of Stuart
Levey, then-Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Treasury
first prevented U-turns from being performed for transactions with Bank Saderat,
one of Iran’s largest state-owned banks.134 Treasury targeted this bank based on
allegations that it had transferred funds to Hezbollah and other U.S.-designated
terrorist groups.135 The Saderat U-turn prohibition made it substantially more
difficult for foreign banks to do business with the bank. By closing this loophole,
Treasury calculated that foreign banks would decide that it would be too burdensome
to maintain business with Bank Saderat.136 Over the next two years, Treasury
withdrew the U-turn exemption for an increasing number of large Iranian banks.137 At

130. FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 37.
131. Matthew Levitt, The Iran Primer: Financial Sanctions, U.S. INST. PEACE,
http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/iranprimer.usip.org/files/Financial%20Sanctions.pdf.
132. The other reason for the exemption was that the State Department wanted to prevent
backlash to U.S. sanctions by its allies who were engaged in business with Iran and would
have found the sudden inability to convert to U.S. currency seriously disruptive. See Brett
Wolf, U-Turns: The History Behind the Loophole That Snared Standard Chartered, THOMSON
REUTERS, Aug. 20, 2012 (unpublished article on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
133. See id.
134. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,569, 53,570 (Sept. 12, 2006) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 560.516); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Revokes Iran’s
U-Turn License, HP-1257 (Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press
-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1257.aspx [hereinafter Treasury Revokes Iran’s U-Turn License].
135. Glenn Kessler, U.S. Moves to Isolate Suspect Iranian Banks, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2006, at A17. The authority for OFAC to take such a measure was granted by Executive
Order 13,224. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 789 (2002).
136. See Danforth Newcomb, Non-U.S. Banks Are Target of Recent Economic Actions by
U.S. Government, 125 BANKING L.J. 468, 469 (2008) (“Although banks with no presence in
the United States are not bound by U.S. economic sanctions, these recent OFAC actions also
impose indirect burdens on non-U.S. financial institutions engaging in certain transactions
with these Iranian banks.”).
137. In January 2007, Treasury, specifically OFAC, named Bank Sepah and its wholly
owned subsidiary incorporated in the United Kingdom, Bank Sepah International PLC. See
generally Exec. Order No. 13,382, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 172 (2006) (providing the legal means by
which naming occurs). See also Kittrie, supra note 9, at 806; John F. Cooney, Targeted
Financial Sanctions, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2009, at 8, 8; Tisdall, supra note 112
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the end of 2008, Treasury revoked its authorization of U-turn transactions for Iranian
banks entirely.138
In 2010, the government’s use of financial sticks to shape foreign bank
incentives took a more aggressive turn. Rather than simply make transactions
between Iran and third parties more difficult, the government began to force foreign
banks to choose between maintaining ties to certain designated entities and
protecting their access to U.S. banks. The shift in strategy and turn to its second
type of financial stick was prompted by a number of Iranian actions, including
Iran’s admission in September 2009 that it had built a secret underground uranium
enrichment plant.139
The initial move to step up financial pressure came from Congress and the
President, not Treasury. Congress enacted the 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA),140 which lawyers at one U.S. law
firm describe as marking “a sea-change in the breadth and severity of economic
sanctions against Iran.”141 Specifically, section 104 of the Act seeks to deter foreign
(“[T]he U.S. treasury and associated agencies have been spinning an expanding, entangling
web of unilateral sanctions and other punitive measures around Iran’s financial institutions
and commercial enterprises.”); Juan C. Zarate, Harnessing the Financial Furies: Smart
Financial Power and National Security, WASH. Q., October 2009, at 43, 53 [hereinafter
Zarate, Harnessing the Financial Furies].
138. Iranian Transactions Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,541 (Nov. 10, 2008) (amending
various provisions of 31 C.F.R. pt. 560); Treasury Revokes Iran’s U-Turn License, supra note
134.
139. Ian Traynor & Julian Borger, Iran Admits Secret Uranium Enrichment Plant,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/25/iran
-admits-uranium-plant. The strategy shift was also in response to Iran’s test-firing long-range
missiles a few weeks later and its backpedaling from a tentative agreement to a proposed
enriched uranium deal. Iran Test-Fires Long-Range Missiles, CNN (Sept. 28, 2009, 11:35
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/09/28/iran.missile.tests/index.html. The
deal would have required Iran to transfer seventy-five percent of its enriched uranium for
processing by other countries. David Blair, Iran Pulls Back from Deal on Uranium
Enrichment, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/middleeast/iran/6376902/Iran-pulls-back-from-deal-on-uranium-enrichment.html. Although
Obama continued to press Iran to agree to the uranium-transfer deal, he abandoned that
effort after Iran announced, in February 2010, the decision to begin enriching its uranium
stockpile. See Alan Cowell & Thom Shanker, Iran’s Enrichment Plans Prompt New
Sanction Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at A6. Other factors also pushed the Obama
Administration and Congress in the direction of harsher measures, including pressure from
Israel and a desire to signal to other governments in the region that they would not need to
begin their own nuclear buildup. See Mark Landler, U.S. Is Seeking Tougher Tactics Against
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at A1; see also Isabel Kershner, Israel Voices Unease over
Iran Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at A14; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, U.S.
Speeding up Missile Defenses in Persian Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at A1.
140. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8501 (2012)). Obama signed it into
law on July 1, 2010. CISADA amended the Iran Sanctions Act, which replaced the ILSA in
2006, following Libya’s renunciation of terrorism and WMD. See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 1–2, 4–5, 5 n.5 (2010).
141. Anthony Rapa, Amy J. Lentz, Peter Edward Jeydel, Edward J. Krauland & Meredith
Rathbone, U.S. Sanctions on Iran: 2012 Year in Review, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Feb. 25,
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banks from dealing with the Iranian government (including Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard) and other entities allegedly facilitating the development of Iran’s WMD
program or supporting terrorism, including those entities sanctioned by the U.N. or
designated by prior executive orders.142 It does so primarily by empowering the
Executive with a severe financial stick: the authority to deny foreign banks access
to the U.S. financial market.143 If Treasury (specifically OFAC) issues a finding that
a foreign bank has knowingly conducted business with U.S.-designated actors, it
places the foreign bank on the “Part 561 List” and imposes strict conditions on or
forbids U.S. banks from opening or maintaining a correspondent or payable-through
account for that foreign bank.144 Although such findings and Part 561 listings are
exceedingly rare,145 the sheer threat of them is a powerful deterrent.146
Congress deployed what is arguably its harshest financial stick in 2012, placing
unprecedented pressure on both foreign banks and foreign oil companies. The
central banking-related provisions enacted in the National Defense Authorization
2013), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-pdf.html/pdf/?item_id=8648.
142. These entities include parties that directly facilitate or engage in money laundering
to facilitate Iran’s acquiring of WMD or support for terrorism, parties subject to U.N.
financial sanctions, and parties that facilitate transactions or provide significant financial
services for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or affiliates, or any party whose assets are
blocked in connection with Iran’s proliferation of WMD or support for international
terrorism. See 22 U.S.C. § 8513(c)(2) (2012). OFAC issued the Iranian Financial Sanctions
Regulations (implementing this CISADA provision) in August 2010. See 31 C.F.R.
§ 561.201 (2012) (updated since ITRA was enacted); see also Rapa et al., supra note 141.
Executive Orders 13,224 and 13,382 authorize OFAC to block property of those who have
committed or are at risk of committing terrorism and those who assist in the proliferation of
WMD. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 789 (2002) (terrorism); Exec. Order No.
13,382, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 172 (2006) (WMD proliferation).
143. In targeting foreign banks, Congress sought to undermine Iran’s economy by
preventing Iranian businesses from being able to acquire letters of credit that are necessary
for transactions with foreign businesses. KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS 2014, supra note 95, at
27. CISADA also sought to isolate Iran by: (1) stepping up pressure on foreign oil
companies by expanding the scope of activity proscribed by the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act,
and (2) using a broad definition of “equipment and services” to prohibit the supply of refined
petroleum and refining equipment or services by foreign or domestic persons. See
Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1250–51 (2011).
144. 31 C.F.R. § 561.201 (2014). These restrictive conditions include: (1) prohibiting or
restricting any provision of trade finance; (2) restricting transactions processed through the
accounts; (3) placing monetary or volume limits on the transactions processed through the
accounts; (4) requiring preapproval from the U.S. financial institution for all transactions
processed through the accounts; or (5) prohibiting or restricting the processing of foreign
exchange transactions through the account. § 561.201(b).
145. Only four institutions have ever been sanctioned under Part 561. The Part 561 List
has not been updated since May 17, 2013, when Elaf Islamic Bank was removed. See OFFICE
OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE LIST OF FOREIGN
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO PART 561 (THE PART 561 LIST) (2013), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/561list.pdf.
146. See supra text accompanying note 122. CISADA also mandated that U.S. banks and
other financial institutions be penalized under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) if they know, or should have known, that their foreign-owned or controlled
subsidiaries had engaged in prohibited transactions with Iran. See 22 U.S.C. § 8513(d) (2012).
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Act of 2012 (NDAA) prohibit U.S. banks from establishing new correspondent and
payable-through accounts and require them to severely restrict existing accounts
with any foreign bank that knowingly engages in transactions with the Central
Bank of Iran (CBI) or any designated Iranian bank.147 The provisions also forbid
U.S. banks from maintaining such accounts for banks, including foreign central
banks and state-owned or controlled banks, domiciled in a country that sells or
purchases petroleum to or from Iran.148
In August 2012, President Obama also signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRA), which extends designations to new entities and
codifies a 2012 executive order that imposed correspondent banking restrictions on
foreign banks engaged in business with two Iranian petroleum companies.149 In
addition, building on the 2010 banking provisions of CISADA, the ITRA imposes
liability on U.S. parent companies of foreign-owned or controlled subsidiaries that
conduct any transactions with Iran.150 The ITRA increases the number of sanctions the
President is required to impose from CISADA’s three of nine to at least five of
twelve.151
Finally, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, a component
of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, requires Treasury to take specific
measures against any foreign bank that facilitates “significant financial”
transactions with Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors.152 These
measures include requiring U.S. banks to cut off correspondent banking relations.
President Obama followed up with a 2013 executive order that, for the first time,
sanctions persons engaging in any “significant transaction” involving Iran’s
currency, the rial.153
These financial sticks appear to have influenced foreign bank calculations because
they force a stark and costly choice between U.S. and Iranian markets. The sheer
complexity of the sanction regime may have exerted an additional deterrent effect:
seeking to avoid the laborious task of having to determine their compliance with U.S.
laws and regulations, foreign banks refrain from creating any new ties with Iran, even
for legitimate activity. As one U.S. lawyer asserts, “Because entities in Dubai and Abu
Dhabi do not necessarily have expertise and sophistication in respect of US laws, this

147. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1245, 125 Stat. 1298, 1647–50 (2012) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8513a (2012)).
148. 22 U.S.C. § 8513a(d)(4) (2012); see also Rapa et al., supra note 141.
149. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA), Pub. L. No.
112-158, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8701 (2012)).
150. 22 U.S.C. § 8725 (2012).
151. These twelve sanctions include, inter alia: prohibiting U.S. persons from investing in
or purchasing significant quantities of equity or debt; prohibiting the U.S. government from
contracting with a sanctioned entity; prohibiting transfers or payments between financial
institutions involving any interest in a sanctioned entity, where the transfers or payments are
subject to U.S. jurisdiction; and prohibiting most transactions of property in which a
sanctioned entity has interest that is in U.S. jurisdiction. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2012).
152. 22 U.S.C. § 8803(d) (2012); see also Rapa et al., supra note 141.
153. Exec. Order No. 13,645, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,945 (June 3, 2013). The executive order
permits the Treasury to prohibit the opening of, or put strict conditions on maintaining, a
payable-through or correspondent account by the financial institution and to block all of the
financial institution’s interests in property in the United States. Id. § 1(b).
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just adds a layer of confusion and fear . . . . That itself can lead to companies . . .
avoiding any kind of Iran business out of fear of possibly getting into trouble in the
US.”154
Finally, as its third financial stick, the United States has imposed or threatened
to impose significant fines on foreign banks that violate U.S. laws and regulations
prohibiting business with Iran or Iranian entities.155 For instance, in 2009, Treasury
reached a $536 million settlement with Credit Suisse for facilitating transactions for
Iran.156 In 2012 and 2013, partly due to violations of the Iranian sanctions
regulations, the Dutch bank ING,157 British bank Standard Chartered,158 and British
bank HSBC159 agreed to settlements of $619 million, $340 million, and $1.9

154. Colin Simpson, UAE Businesses to Feel Effect of Fresh US Sanctions on Iran,
NATIONAL (U.A.E.) (July 3, 2013), http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/uae-businesses
-to-feel-effect-of-fresh-us-sanctions-on-iran (quoting Farhad Alavi, a partner at the Akrivis
Law Group) (internal quotation marks omitted). Another U.S. law firm describes the
deterrent effect of the increasingly complex legal landscape in these terms:
Because these [rules] at times seem almost purposefully confusing, many
non-U.S. financial institutions are carefully scrutinizing business because of the
mere possibility, however remote, that an attenuated Iranian interest in a
transaction would expose the bank to sanctions, possibly to a significant fine,
and to adverse publicity. The strongest impact of these sanctions may be their
mere existence rather than their exercise, as highly-regulated and risk-averse
financial institutions steer well clear of the line.
Sean M. Thornton, Iran, Non-U.S. Banks, and Secondary Sanctions: Understanding the Trends,
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.skadden.com
/sites/default/files/publications/Iran_Non-US_Banks_and_Secondary_Sanctions_0.pdf (emphasis
added).
155. See KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS 2014, supra note 95, at 27.
156. Claudio Gatti & John Eligon, Iranian Dealings Lead to a Fine for Credit Suisse,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at B1.
157. ING was charged with concealing $1.6 billion in illegal transactions with Iranian and
Cuban clients, in violation of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2012), and the Trading With the
Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44 (2012). DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MUL-565595,
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions
/CivPen/Documents/06122012_ing_agreement.pdf; see also Annie Lowrey, ING Bank to Pay
$619 Million to Settle Inquiry into Sanctions Violations, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at B3; Karen
Freifeld, ING to Pay $619 Mln over Cuba, Iran Sanctions, REUTERS, June 12, 2012, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/ing-sanctions-idUSL1E8HC5Q420120612.
158. Standard Chartered was charged with concealing nearly 60,000 transactions with Iranian
clients over ten years, involving at least $250 billion and generating hundreds of thousands of
dollars in fees, in violation of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2012), and the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act (FNKDA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1908 (2012). DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
MUL-607200, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource
-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/121210_SCB_settlement.pdf; see also David Benoit,
Standard Chartered’s Fine Tally Runs to $667 Million, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:15 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/12/10/standard-chartereds-fine-tally-runs-to-667-million; Karen
Freifeld & Carrick Mollenkamp, Standard Chartered Reaches $340 Mln Settlement over Iran,
REUTERS, Aug. 14, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/14
/standardchartered-probe-idUSL6E8JE3QK20120814.
159. HSBC was charged with processing 203 electronic transactions totaling more than
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billion, respectively. In 2014, the United States imposed its largest fine to date: $8.9
billion on the French bank BNP for its violations of sanctions on Iran (as well as
Sudan and Cuba).160
These settlements suggest that, at least until these penalties were imposed, the
government’s financial sticks were not sufficient to deter some of the leading
global banks from sweeping breaches of the Iran sanctions regime. For years on
end, these banks flagrantly violated these regulations by conducting illicit
transactions with Iran. They likely calculated that the profits from illicit
transactions outweighed the risks and costs of getting caught.
Yet it would be mistaken to assume that evidence of violations means that the
use of financial sticks has had no effect. Aggregate economic data, some specific to
banks, suggest that banks were indeed limiting their ties with Iran, even as these
violations were ongoing.161 The true test of the use of financial sticks against the
largest global banks is still ahead, and turns on whether such banks are, in light of
the recent heavy penalties and restrictions on operations, newly motivated to
comply with U.S. regulations.162
B. High-Profile Blacklists
In advancing its security agenda, the U.S. government has, to a more limited
extent, also harnessed foreign banks by means that are less explicitly coercive than
using financial sticks: employing high-profile blacklists. The government uses
many forms of blacklists (or designations) for national security reasons, the most
frequent and well known being the SDN List.163 This Article focuses on a different
type of blacklist, which it terms “high-profile blacklists.”164 In this much more
$164 million with Iran, in violation of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2012), and the
TWEA, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44 (2012). Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v.
HSBC Bank, (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) (Cr. No. 12-763); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
MUL-615225, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/121211_HSBC_Settlement.pdf; see also Ben
Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank Said to Avoid Charges over Laundering, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, at A1; Kevin Scura, HSBC and Money Laundering: “Too Big To
Indict,” AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com
/aclr-online/hsbc-and-money-laundering-too-big-indict.
160. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Reaches Largest Ever
Sanctions-Related Settlement with BNP Paribas SA for $963 Million (June 30, 2014),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2447.aspx.
161. See infra Part II.B; see also KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20871,
IRAN SANCTIONS 53–56 (2013) [hereinafter KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS 2013]; Steven R.
Weisman, Pressed by U.S., European Banks Limit Iran Deals, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at A1;
Laurence Norman, Swift to Cut Ties with Iran Banks After EU Ban, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303863404577283532862521716.
162. Still, these types of restrictions are, to at least some degree, inevitably self-busting: the
more actors adhere to them, the greater the gain for any one actor who decides to violate them.
163. SDN LIST, supra note 78.
164. High-profile blacklists differ from SDN blacklists (or SDN designations) in two
respects. First, they are high profile partly because they are relatively rare. These blacklists
thus are well-recognized events in the finance community. For instance, newspapers are
much more likely to report blacklisting under section 311 than an SDN designation. See,
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salient blacklist, Treasury issues (under section 311 of the Patriot Act) a finding
and notice of rulemaking that a foreign jurisdiction or foreign bank is a “primary
money laundering concern.”165 It engages in this high-profile targeting with the
goal of influencing other actors—here both domestic and foreign banks—to break
ties with the blacklisted entity. High-profile blacklists can be considered
semiformal because, despite their explicit congressional authorization, Treasury
does not impose legal obligations on U.S. actors at the time of its blacklisting. It
may, but is not required to, follow up a blacklisting by issuing a final ruling
directing U.S. banks to take one or more of five “special measures” against the
blacklisted institution, such as heightened due diligence or closing correspondent
accounts.166 But even when it refrains from using these financial sticks, the
government anticipates that foreign banks may abandon business with the blacklisted
entity in order to preserve their market access167 or protect their reputational standing,
particularly with other banks.168 As Juan Zarate, former Deputy National Security
Adviser for Combating Terrorism, explained, section 311 enabled Treasury to put
targeted banks under the global spotlight and “make them radioactive to
reputation-conscious banks worldwide.”169

e.g., Rachel Louise Ensign, FBME Bank Named Primary Money Laundering Concern,
WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2014, 6:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/07
/17/fbme-bank-ltd-named-as-primary-money-laundering-concern. By contrast, there are
thousands of SDN listings, which the government frequently revises, making such changes
more routine. Second, unlike SDN lists, section 311 has a proposed rulemaking period in
which it announces that an entity is at risk of being penalized, but does not actually impose
the penalty unless it adopts a final rule. By contrast, once an SDN designation is made, the
entity’s assets in the United States are frozen and transactions involving it are blocked. That
is, the central purpose of an SDN designation is to cut the listed entity out of the U.S. market
rather than, as in high-profile blacklists, influence foreign entities to cut their ties with the
listed entity. Nonetheless, foreign entities sometimes follow the U.S. SDN List even when
they are not legally obliged.
165. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 311, 116 Stat. 272, 298–304 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2012)).
166. Specifically, financial institutions under U.S. jurisdiction may be required to maintain
records on: (1) transactions occurring in a jurisdiction outside of the United States, (2) the
beneficial ownership of any account opened or maintained in the United States, (3) the identity
and other information of any customer who opens or maintains a payable-through account, or
(4) the identity and other information of any customer who opens or maintains a correspondent
account involving any jurisdiction of primary money-laundering concern. Treasury may also
prohibit banks from opening or maintaining a payable-through or correspondent account
involving any jurisdiction of primary money-laundering concern, or impose restrictive
conditions on such accounts. 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b) (2012).
167. For instance, foreign (and domestic) banks may reduce ties preemptively, expecting
the government to impose follow-up measures later on.
168. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. For a recent survey suggesting the
importance of reputation in the financial sector, see Scott Tangney, The 2014 Makovsky Wall
Street Reputation Study, MAKOVSKY INTEGRATED COMM. (June 17, 2014),
http://www.makovsky.com/insights/blogs/word-on-the-street/28-insights/blogs/word-on-the
-street/641-wall-street-reputation-study-2014.
169. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR, supra note 118, at 152.
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The government’s formative experience with high-profile blacklisting was with
a Macau-based bank named Banco Delta Asia (BDA), one of the most important
foreign banks dealing with North Korea.170 Although hostile relations between the
United States and North Korea date back more than half a century, North Korea’s
withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 dramatically
increased its perceived threat to Asia-Pacific security arrangements and the United
States. In 2005, as part of a policy to intensify pressure on North Korea, Treasury
blacklisted BDA as a first step under section 311 on the grounds that the bank had
laundered money used to facilitate the proliferation and counterfeiting of WMD.171
Even without taking the second step of wielding a financial stick in the form of a
“special measure” or issuance of a final rule, Treasury’s naming of BDA had
immediate, dramatic effects in the months following its section 311 blacklisting.172
First, concerned that other banks would also be designated, Macau authorities took
over BDA and froze $25 million of North Korean assets.173 Soon after, the bank’s
customers moved $130 million out of their accounts.174 In less than a week, the
bank had lost one third of its deposits.175
More striking, the mere naming of BDA had a powerful impact on both U.S. and
foreign banks. In what one journalist has likened to a “ripple” effect,176 banks
across Europe and Asia with and without ties to the United States began to severely
limit or entirely cut off their banking ties with BDA and North Korea.177 In January

170. For a rare insider account of the BDA action, see DAVID L. ASHER, VICTOR D.
COMRAS & PATRICK M. CRONIN, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., PRESSURE: COERCIVE ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 42–48 (2011). As the authors state, the
government intended to use the BDA designation for three purposes: as a signal to China
about the financial transactions of Chinese banks with North Korea, as a threat should
negotiations with North Korea break down, and as an important instrument for unveiling
evidence linking top North Korean officials to widespread criminal activity and exposing
banks in Macau as complicit in money laundering. Id. at 43. It is worth noting that Asher et
al. do not mention what scholars and the public often assume to be the main driver of U.S.
sanctions: delaying or impeding North Korea’s nuclear program.
171. Finding That Banco Delta Asia SARL Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money
Laundering Concern, 70 Fed. Reg. 55,214 (Sept. 20, 2005). This was not the first time
Treasury had designated an institution under section 311. In 2003, Treasury designated two
banks in Burma as primary money-laundering concerns. See J.C. SHARMAN, THE MONEY
LAUNDRY: REGULATING CRIMINAL FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 121 (2011). It is not
entirely clear why this designation did not have the same impact, but possible explanations
include that many countries already had sanctions against Burma and that Burmese banks
were, compared to BDA, not as connected to foreign banks.
172. The Treasury Department imposed special measures only two years later, in March
2007. Special Measures Against Banco Delta Asia, 31 C.F.R. § 103.193 (2010).
173. Steven R. Weisman, The Ripples of Punishing One Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007,
at C1 [hereinafter Weisman, Ripples]; see also ASHER ET AL., supra note 170, at 43–44;
SHARMAN, supra note 171, at 123.
174. Javier Serrat, Money Talks: The Surging Revolution in Counter-Proliferation
Strategy, RUSI J., Dec. 2011, at 40, 42.
175. SHARMAN, supra note 171, at 122.
176. See Weisman, Ripples, supra note 173.
177. SHARMAN, supra note 171, at 123 (“U.S. banks did not wait for the results of the
FinCEN investigation but immediately cut their ties with the bank, as did major Korean and
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2006, USB and Credit Suisse were among the first major banks to cut back on their
transactions.178 By the summer of 2007, German, French, and British banks had
followed suit, with Dubai banks close behind. Notably, these banks were not acting
out of a formal legal obligation because Treasury had not issued a final rule
imposing any special measures.
In hindsight, banks’ decisions to cut ties with BDA and North Korea were
probably motivated by both market access and reputational concerns, which are
intertwined. Both U.S. banks and foreign banks with U.S. branches may have acted
preemptively, expecting special measures to be imminent. Banks without U.S. ties
may have cut off connections based on concerns that they, too, would be
blacklisted for holding North Korean or BDA accounts.179
In addition to these considerations of direct market access, both U.S. and foreign
banks may have been influenced by more indirect, harmful reputational costs of
being associated with a bank listed as a primary money-laundering concern.180 This
potential influence of reputational concerns is evident in the United States’ attempt
to return BDA’s frozen assets two years later during negotiations with North Korea.
North Korea had mandated recovery of its funds as a precondition for proceeding
with the negotiations.181 The U.S. government approached a number of U.S. and
foreign banks to transfer the money back to North Korea, but the banks refused.182
In the end, after promising that it would not enforce its own regulations in this
instance,183 the United States was able to convince the Russian Central Bank and
the Far Eastern Bank in Vladivostok to facilitate the transaction.184 Two years later,
Treasury did impose follow-up measures requiring banks under U.S. jurisdiction to
cut their ties with BDA.185 By this time, however, the issue was moot; banks had
already closed their accounts.
The important point here is not that reputational concerns influenced foreign
bank decision making; that is ultimately an empirical question that warrants more
analysis. Rather, the central claim is that U.S. government officials, both within and
outside Treasury, shaped their policy to leverage reputational dynamics in the
financial sector to extend their influence over foreign banks—even those with weak
U.S. ties. As then-Treasury Secretary Paulson stated in 2007, “[O]nce some in the
private sector decide to cut off those we have targeted, it becomes an even greater
Japanese institutions. The reverberation effect of blacklisting . . . came into play.”); see also
Zarate, Harnessing the Financial Furies, supra note 137, at 48.
178. Loeffler, supra note 129, at 106.
179. SHARMAN, supra note 171, at 123 n.76 and accompanying text (citing Treasury
official Danny Glaser stating that the designation of BDA was “a shot heard round the world
for national bankers who cut off relations with North Korea, fearing that something like what
happened [to BDA] could happen to them”).
180. See id. at 102.
181. This demand triggered “vigorous debate” within the government, with some
supporting the return of funds, and others opposing it on legal grounds. FEAVER & LORBER,
supra note 14, at 27. See generally ASHER ET AL., supra note 170, at 42–48.
182. FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 27 (citing Weisman, Ripples, supra note 173).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Finalizes Rule Against Banco Delta
Asia BDA Cut Off From U.S. Financial System, HP-315 (Mar. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp315.aspx.
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reputational risk for others not to follow, and so they often do.”186 Political
scientists Peter Feaver and Eric Lorber explain the logic further:
The rest of the system responds this way not necessarily because they
agree with the designation—and perhaps not at all because they
sympathize with the larger political aims—but simply because they
agree that if others think this particular entity might be tainted they do
not want the taint on them.187
This worry about being tainted may apply not only to the initially blacklisted
individual or entity, but also to its business partners.
The reputational logic that the U.S. government sought to trigger with its
high-profile blacklisting thus concerns intra-industry reputation more than
reputation with the general public or individual clients.188 Banks worry that they
may lose standing in the eyes of other banks, thus damaging their
creditworthiness.189 Ample scholarship on the importance of reputation in the
banking industry suggests that the government’s calculation about the role of
reputation is at least plausible rather than mere posturing.190 As legal scholar
Antoinette Verhage states, “Surprisingly, banks most fear the effect on their
reputation with regard to other banks. Not many respondents worried about the
effect of money laundering scandals on their clients.”191 If one bank facilitates
transactions with a U.S.-designated bank, other banks are likely to move their

186. Henry M. Paulson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at the C. Peter
McColough Series on International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations (June 14,
2007) [hereinafter Remarks by Sec’y Paulson] (transcript available at http://www.cfr.org
/world/c-peter-mccolough-series-international-economics-henry-m-paulson-rush-transcript
-federal-news-service/p13620).
187. FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 34.
188. Reputation among clients, however, also plays a role, and financial institutions tend
to be particularly sensitive here too. Banks offer a homogeneous product. As Feaver and
Lorber argue, “[A]ll financial institutions are selling the same thing—a dollar is a dollar,
whoever gives it to you . . . .” Id. at 33. Banks thus must compete on the rates and range of
the services they offer as well as on their reputations. “The ‘brand’ of a bank is not so much
the quality of the money but the quality of the overall reputation for confidential and prudent
business practices.” Id. Reputational damage is often viewed as a negative indicator of a
bank’s financial soundness and future stability. Jackie Harvey & Siu Fung Lau,
Crime-Money, Reputation and Reporting, 52 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 57, 59 (2009).
189. ANTOINETTE VERHAGE, THE ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING COMPLEX AND THE
COMPLIANCE INDUSTRY 39 (2011) (stating that reputational damage can lead “to the loss of
trustworthiness with regard to other banks”).
190. See, e.g., id.; Harvey & Lau, supra note 188. For a recent argument challenging the
importance of reputation in the banking industry, see JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF
CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET (2013).
191. VERHAGE, supra note 189, at 81. Verhage further writes: “Reputation is stated to be
one of the most important factors in the financial sector and can therefore be used as a
mechanism to put pressure on the sector.” Id. at 38; see also id. at 81 (naming reputation as the
most cited motive by bankers in explaining their investments in their compliance programs);
Michael Jacobson, Sanctions Against Iran: A Promising Struggle, WASH. Q., Summer 2008, at
69, 74 (2008) (“Maintaining stellar reputations is one of a bank’s top priorities.”).
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business elsewhere.192 Bank officials themselves have frequently stated that they
comply with U.S. policy to protect their reputations.193
The BDA blacklisting experience demonstrated to U.S. officials that they did
not have to do much to influence the decisions of banks across the globe.194 As
Zarate explained, “[W]hat appeared to be a simple unilateral regulation against a
private bank unleashed the market-based financial furies against North Korea.”195
As U.S. government officials view it, once they raise the red flag through
blacklisting an entity, foreign and domestic banks cut ties for prudential reasons
concerning market access and reputation. As former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice observed, Treasury’s novel strategy has relied on the banks’
self-interest “to protect their reputation and protect their investment.”196
Treasury’s experience with BDA provided insights that the government began to
apply in 2006 in its new campaign against Iran. One journalist described Treasury’s
new logic: “Banks were only as reputable as their clients’ practices. And the
reputations of banks that did business with Iran were at risk as long as Iran financed
extremists and pursued missile and nuclear technology.”197 Then-Under Secretary
Levey understood that these reputational concerns could reverberate beyond the
limits of Treasury’s regulatory reach.198 Whether for market access or reputational
incentives, the sheer act of naming a foreign bank, without any follow-up action
implicating foreign bank partners, seemed to have gained traction.
The government’s reliance on high-profile blacklists as a tactic is relatively rare,
but still important.199 In 2011, for instance, the government blacklisted two Syrian
banks under section 311 and took the special measure of requiring banks under

192. See FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 33.
193. See id. at 38, 42.
194. Weisman, Ripples, supra note 173.
195. Zarate, Harnessing the Financial Furies, supra note 137, at 51. Rachel L. Loeffler
writes that “the mere announcement of a possible regulatory measure that would apply only
to U.S. institutions caused banks around the world to refrain from dealing with BDA and
North Korea.” Loeffler, supra note 129, at 104.
196. Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, supra note 109.
197. Id.
198. Thornton, supra note 154.
U.S. authorities may not have expected to compel the non-U.S. banks to drop such
business altogether, but they appealed to the reputational concerns of these entities,
and authorities intended to close off access to the U.S. financial system for such
business. Many non-U.S. financial institutions responded favorably, and some
announced that they were voluntarily terminating their Iran-related business.
Id.
199. Between 2011 and 2014, Treasury named only seven institutions as primary money
laundering concerns under section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2012).
Section 311—Special Measures: Special Measures for Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions, or
International Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern, U.S. DEPARTMENT
TREASURY FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/section311.html. Most
recently, Treasury designated FBME bank as a primary money-laundering concern. Rachel
Louise Ensign, FBME Bank Named Primary Money Laundering Concern, WALL ST. J. (July
17, 2014, 6:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/07/17/fbme-bank-ltd-named
-as-primary-money-laundering-concern.
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U.S. jurisdiction to cut off their ties with both banks.200 One unnamed government
official noted that the blacklisting could potentially move Russian banks to limit
ties with their Syrian partners. As the official explained, Russian banks might fear
that doing business with Syrian banks would put their U.S. accounts at risk.201 To
be sure, Russia’s more recent invasion of Ukraine and Treasury’s subsequent
financial restrictions on Russian banks and other entities complicates this picture.202
But the logic underlying Treasury’s tactic of semiformal measures still prevails. As
Rachel L. Loeffler notes, “Banks outside the United States often adhere to U.S. watch
lists even when they are not required by domestic or international law to do so.”203
C. Direct Diplomacy
The final and most informal tactic that Treasury uses to enlist the help of foreign
banks is “direct diplomacy.” In addition to meeting with foreign government
officials, Treasury officials meet directly with foreign bank executives to elicit their
cooperation with U.S. policy, both to track and stop illicit financial flows. Although
the government uses direct diplomacy regularly with foreign government officials
and domestic firms,204 as far as the public record shows, this form of systematic
diplomatic outreach to foreign bank executives emerged only after 9/11. In source,
direct diplomacy is less formal than blacklisting and financial sticks, since the legal
sources Treasury might point to for its authority do not specifically authorize or
discuss diplomacy.205 Like high-profile blacklists, direct diplomacy is similarly
informal in content; it does not impose legal obligations on those involved in the
meetings. Nonetheless, it too may trigger foreign banks’ concerns about market
access and reputation, moving them to shut down ties even in the absence of a
binding legal obligation.
One example of direct diplomacy comes from the government’s efforts to
collect financial intelligence from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT), a private Belgium-incorporated telecommunications
consortium of foreign banks.206 Established in 1973 by European banks,207 SWIFT

200. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Sanctions State-Owned Syrian
Financial Institutions and Syria’s Largest Mobile Phone Operator (Aug. 10, 2011), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1273.aspx (designating the
Commercial Bank of Syria and the Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank).
201. Arshad Mohammed, Russian Banks Should Beware Blacklisted Syria Banks: U.S.
Official, REUTERS, Jan. 7, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/us-syria-usa
-banks-idUSBRE9060S420130107.
202. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Announcement of Additional Treasury
Sanctions on Russian Financial Institutions and on a Defense Technology Entity (July 29,
2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2590.aspx.
Cut off from the U.S. market, these banks now have nothing to lose in continuing, and
indeed strengthening, their ties with those Syrian banks identified as primary money
laundering concerns.
203. Loeffler, supra note 129, at 102.
204. See KENNETH A. RODMAN, SANCTIONS BEYOND BORDERS (2001).
205. Infra note 250 and accompanying text.
206. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. After 9/11 to
Block Terror Networks, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1; see also Henderson, supra note
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serves essentially as an “electronic postal service for the financial industry.”208 It
does not accept deposits but instead transfers messages between international
parties to a financial transaction.209 In the words of one journalist, SWIFT is the
“mother lode, the Rosetta stone for financial data.”210 Along with a U.S.-based
private consortium, Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS),211
SWIFT has acquired a near monopoly on bank messaging.212 Almost every
international bank transaction is sent through SWIFT networks and SWIFT servers.
Tapping into the SWIFT database is, as one legal scholar put it, “a childhood dream
for many intelligence officers.”213
Between 2002 and 2006, Treasury convinced SWIFT officials to covertly hand
over troves of financial data. When SWIFT officials hesitated, Treasury, and the
executive branch more broadly, turned to direct diplomacy to ensure SWIFT’s
continued collaboration. Compared to financial sticks and high-profile blacklists,
Treasury’s tactic was legally informal: there seemed to be no explicit congressional
approval or executive order mandating its direct diplomacy campaign, nor did the
campaign itself impose legal obligations on SWIFT officials.214 Yet, for a time,
32, at 981; Glenn R. Simpson, Treasury Tracks Financial Data in Secret Program, WALL
ST. J., June 23, 2006, at A1.
207. SWIFT History, SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company_information
/swift_history.
208. JOHANNES KÖPPEL, THE SWIFT AFFAIR: SWISS BANKING SECRECY AND THE FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCING § 1.1 (2011), available at http://books.openedition.org/iheid/321.
209. Id.
210. ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 243 (2008)
[hereinafter LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW].
211. CHIPS is the world’s largest private-sector U.S.-dollar funds-transfer system. About
CHIPS, CLEARING HOUSE, http://www.chips.org/about/pages/033738.php. SWIFT sends the
execution instructions for most of the financial transfers effected by CHIPS. Alexander Bligh,
Developing Intelligence in the Field of Financing Terror—An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror
Inter Agency and Cross Border Cooperation: The Security of Financial Systems Dimension,
2011 EUR. CONF. ON INFO. WARFARE & SEC. 31, 33 (article on file with Indiana Law Journal).
212. In 2012, SWIFT transferred approximately 18 million messages per day, for a total
of approximately 4.6 billion messages that year. SWIFT has more than 10,500 subscribers in
215 countries. Company Information, SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company
_information/company_information.
213. KÖPPEL, supra note 208, § 1.2. As a financial messenger, SWIFT, under direction of
the European Union, also has the power to block the flow of money by excluding banks from
its consortium. This is precisely what it did in the case of Iran in 2012, seemingly under U.S.
pressure. Christopher Harress, The Treasury’s War on Russia: Sanctions May Bite but the
Strongest Tool Is Unlikely to Be Used, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014, 2:00 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/treasurys-war-russia-sanctions-may-bite-strongest-tool-unlikely-be
-used-1563608.
214. Byron Calame, Secrecy, Security, the President and the Press, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/02/opinion/02pub-ed.html (“Secrecy is vital for
intelligence and national security programs, but so is oversight by the courts or elected
legislators. The Swift program, however, doesn’t seem to have any specific Congressional
approval or formal authorization. The Treasury Department has not provided a list of who in
Congress was informed, or when, The Times has reported.”). As discussed below, SWIFT
was legally obliged to transfer data based on Treasury’s use of monthly subpoenas, not based
on Treasury’s diplomatic outreach. See infra note 217.
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direct diplomacy worked: the SWIFT surveillance operation was the government’s
primary source of financial intelligence during this period, one that the government
claims helped to identify a number of terrorists.215 Following the New York Times’
exposure of the surveillance program in 2006, however, SWIFT’s collaboration
with the government became significantly more limited, restricting U.S. access to
intra-European transactions.216
The government-SWIFT partnership is useful in shedding light on how foreign
banks may cooperate with the U.S. government for reasons beyond legal obligation.
At first glance, SWIFT’s cooperation looks like a simple case of legal compulsion
based on territorial jurisdiction; SWIFT had and still has an operation center in the
United States, giving the government, specifically Treasury, the ability to subpoena
and gain full access to SWIFT’s vast repository of financial data.217 Yet, a closer
analysis reveals that this territorial-jurisdiction explanation is only partial. It shows
that the mere assertion of legal authority by the United States does not necessarily
make law the main force motivating foreign firms’ cooperation with U.S. policies.
At least twice before 9/11, the U.S. government issued subpoenas demanding
access to SWIFT’s data.218 For example, it did so in the early 1990s, in the middle
of the “war on drugs,” when under President George H.W. Bush, the Department of
Justice appears to have requested access to SWIFT’s database.219 Following the
1998 embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, the CIA and the
Department of Treasury in the Clinton Administration requested access.220 Both of
these times, SWIFT officials refused.221 Under significant pressure from the first

215. Patrick M. Connorton, Tracking Terrorist Financing Through SWIFT: When U.S.
Subpoenas and Foreign Privacy Law Collide, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 283, 290–91 (2007).
216. James Risen, U.S. Reaches Tentative Deal with Europe on Bank Data, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2007, at A6.
217. Under the authority of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
former President Bush signed Executive Order 13,224 granting Treasury (including OFAC)
the authority to use administrative subpoenas to access financial information. Treasury
worked with the FBI to search the SWIFT database. The FBI presumably had access to this
data through its use of administrative subpoenas called “national security letters.” Siobhan
Gorman, NSA’s Domestic Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps up Data: Terror Fight Blurs Line
over Domain; Tracking Email, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at A1. For a discussion of the
increased use of National Security Letters under the Patriot Act, see Andrew E. Nieland, Note,
National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1201 (2007).
218. KÖPPEL, supra note 208, § 1.2; Justin Santolli, The Terrorist Finance Tracking
Program: Illuminating the Shortcomings of the European Union’s Antiquated Data Privacy
Directive, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 553, 561 (2008).
219. LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW, supra note 210, at 242.
220. KÖPPEL, supra note 208, § 1.2 (citing John Mintz, Bin Laden’s Finances Are
Moving Target, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1998, at A1).
221. According to the opinion by the Belgian Privacy Commission, SWIFT officials
denied the request on numerous logistical grounds such as the subpoena’s time frame and the
consortium’s technological inability to perform specific searches. ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE
COMMISSION DE LA PROTECTION DE LA VIE PRIVEE, OPINION NO. 37/2006, OPINION ON THE
TRANSFER OF PERSONAL DATA BY THE CSLR SWIFT BY VIRTUE OF UST (OFAC)
SUBPOENAS, (2006) (Belg.), available at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments
/2644.pdf [hereinafter ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE COMMISSION]. Legal, cultural, and strategic
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Bush Administration, SWIFT threatened to move its center out of the United States
if the government continued to pressure it.222 The government backed down.223 The
U.S. government’s legal authority did not change between the first two refuted
subpoena attempts and the post-9/11 subpoena. The obvious question arises: Why,
after 9/11, did SWIFT then suddenly agree to cooperate when it had resisted earlier?
A purely legal explanation pointing to territoriality leaves that question unanswered.
SWIFT’s initial post-9/11 cooperation—transferring data to Treasury and CIA
on a monthly basis—appears not to have been a function of direct diplomacy or any
other government strategy.224 Rather, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, SWIFT’s
cooperation seems better explained by a wave of both individual and transnational
support for and identification with the United States.225 In the words of one senior
SWIFT official, before 9/11, “providing access to its sensitive data would have been
anathema to the Belgium-based consortium,” but the 9/11 attacks “led to a new
mindset in many industries, including telecommunications.”226 As the shock of 9/11
reasons also influenced SWIFT’s refusal. As Eric Lichtblau writes, “with Europe’s tough
banking secrecy laws and cultural mindset, SWIFT didn’t want to be seen as a clandestine
partner of the U.S. government in giving away access to sensitive banking data and putting
itself in legal jeopardy in the process.” LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW, supra note 210, at 242.
222. LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW, supra note 210, at 242 (stating that “[t]he Bush
Administration ‘pushed them very hard’” and, “So deep were their reservations that the
company’s executives warned U.S. officials that if they tried to subpoena its banking
information, SWIFT would pull its U.S. outlets off American soil so it couldn’t be forced to
comply with the demand.”). This was not an empty threat: SWIFT moved its intra-European
data to Switzerland after the New York Times exposed the 2002–06 covert surveillance
operation in 2006.
223. See ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE COMMISSION, supra note 221.
224. See Santolli, supra note 218, at 561. Some accounts, moreover, suggest that SWIFT
officials requested the subpoenas in the first place, calculating that if its collaboration were
to ever come to light, the consortium could point to the subpoenas as justification. As
Lichtblau writes, the subpoena was an “afterthought” with “many details of the novel
arrangement left to be worked out.” “The company’s lawyers wanted protection—a
subpoena, a piece of paper, something to make clear if and when the program was exposed
that the company was obligated to cooperate.” LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW, supra note 210, at
243–44 (emphasis in original). SWIFT offers a different account and suggests that it
cooperated because it was legally obliged. SWIFT Statement on Compliance to European
Parliament, SWIFT (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.swift.com/about_swift/legal/eu_parliament
_hearing_swift_statement.
225. Josh Meyer & Greg Miller, U.S. Secretly Tracks Global Bank Data, L.A. TIMES,
June 23, 2006, at A1. At the time of 9/11, SWIFT was headed by an American, Leonard
Schrank, then-President of the Chamber of Commerce in Belgium. When Treasury officials
made the initial call to Schank about accessing SWIFT data, he apparently responded: “What
took you so long?” LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW, supra note 210, at 243; see also Leonard H.
Schrank & Juan C. Zarate, Data Mining, Without Big Brother, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2013, at
A25; Glenn R. Simpson, American Executive in Brussels Aided Terrorist-Tracking Program,
WALL ST. J., June 24, 2006, at A4. Private firms have also cooperated with the government
out of a wave of patriotic loyalty to the U.S. government, which in this case may have
translated into transnational loyalty as well. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, supra
note 24, at 1447 (citing RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE 209–11 (2006)).
226. Meyer & Miller, supra note 225, at A1. Indeed some evidence suggests that SWIFT
officials were, at least initially, eager to cooperate. Realizing, for instance, that they could
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began to abate and the contentious politics of the Iraq War took center stage,
SWIFT’s willingness to give the government essentially carte blanche to access its
enormous data repository began to wane.227 By the spring of 2003, despite monthly
Treasury subpoenas, SWIFT had begun to withhold its data. U.S. government
officials, as New York Times journalist Eric Lichtblau put it, “were panicked.”228
To persuade SWIFT to continue its collaboration, the government did not
impose additional legal obligations or insist on existing ones, but turned instead to
direct diplomacy—specifically, “red-carpet” treatment of SWIFT officials.
Treasury officials, in the words of Lichtblau, “scrambled to set up a day-long series
of emergency meetings in Washington to plead their case directly to SWIFT’s
executives.”229 This direct diplomacy evolved into a “full-court press.”230 CIA
officials gave SWIFT officials a classified briefing in the Situation Room. National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice made “a surprise appearance.”231 High-level
Treasury officials and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan held a meeting with
SWIFT officials. And lastly, FBI Director Robert Mueller shared intelligence showing
the specific instances in which SWIFT data had helped to identify terrorist threats.232
The red-carpet diplomacy strategy worked, although it is difficult to understand
precisely why it was effective.233 One possibility is that the classified information
that the CIA made available was so persuasive that SWIFT officials revised their
calculations about the merits and justifiability of the program. It is also possible
that meetings with top U.S. officials created social and professional pressures that
were hard to resist. SWIFT officials probably had never envisaged that they would
be invited to the White House, much less have direct talks with leading figures of
the Administration. Nor could they have dreamed of being ushered into the
Situation Room for a briefing by the brass of the CIA. A final possibility is that
SWIFT felt reassured by the proposal for new, somewhat more stringent
procedures regulating surveillance operations.234 The new procedures allowed a

not selectively extract the data requested by Treasury, SWIFT officials offered, “We’ll give
you all the data.” LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW, supra note 210, at 244. This stands in stark
contrast to SWIFT officials’ pointing to the inability to extract data as grounds for refusing
the government’s subpoenas prior to 9/11. Meyer & Miller, supra note 225. From Treasury’s
perspective, the grant of blanket access to the data was “an act of true patriotism.”
LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW, supra note 210, at 233.
227. LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW, supra note 210, at 233. This accounting relies heavily on
Lichtblau’s investigative reporting, particularly in Chapter 8.
228. Id. at 234.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 232.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 247.
233. Meyer & Miller, supra note 225.
234. In 2004, SWIFT and the United States signed an agreement “which assured SWIFT
that the original source of the data (i.e. SWIFT) would be kept confidential by the U.S.
Treasury Department.” KÖPPEL, supra note 208, § 1.5. Additionally, the United States
offered to narrow the definition of terrorism for the purposes of search requests and agreed
to allow two SWIFT officials “to be physically present when the CIA searched the data
provided by SWIFT.” Id.
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SWIFT official to be present during data searches and granted SWIFT the authority
to stop searches that appeared to exceed the scope of the investigation.235
The SWIFT-Treasury financial surveillance operation continued undetected for
another three years, until the New York Times disclosed it on June 23, 2006.236 The
fallout of the disclosure exposed the limits of direct diplomacy. The revelation of
the operation incited criticism by some in the United States, including civil rights
groups and both conservative and liberal members of Congress.237 Other political
groups and Bush Administration officials issued statements, some of them scathing,
condemning the New York Times for exposing the covert collaboration.238 In
Europe, news of the SWIFT-U.S. operation triggered outrage.239 Bank regulators,
human rights groups, and many members of the European Parliament were
incensed; they viewed the surveillance program as a blanket violation of European
privacy laws.240 In September 2006, for instance, the Belgian Privacy Commission
released a report rebuking SWIFT for its data transfers.241
In response to this barrage of criticism, SWIFT announced in June 2007 that it
would begin to restructure its data-storage programs to allow for intra-European
financial data to be stored only in Europe.242 Once the restructuring was completed

235. It is unclear whether the revised SWIFT-Treasury agreement posed a meaningful
constraint on data searches. Lichtblau reports that SWIFT officials intervened quite
frequently in the months that followed, LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW, supra note 210, at 248, but
Köppel suggests the authority was mostly symbolic, see KÖPPEL, supra note 208, §1.5.
236. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 206.
237. Peter Baker, Surveillance Disclosure Denounced, WASH. POST, June 27, 2006, at
A1; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Says Government Spying on Bank Records is Further
Abuse of Power, (June 23, 2006), available at https://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclusays-government-spying-bank-records-further-abuse-power.
238. Baker, supra note 237. Some legal scholars also disparaged the New York Times’
decision to reveal the program. See Jack Goldsmith, Secrecy and Safety, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug.
13, 2008, at 31; see also Anthony Amicelle, The Great (Data) Bank Robbery: Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program and the “SWIFT Affair,” RESEARCH QUESTIONS, May 2011, at 1, 7–
8, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2282627. Six weeks after the publication, New York
Times editor Byron Calame issued a public apology for publishing the piece. Byron Calame,
Can ‘Magazines’ of the Times Subsidize News Coverage?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at C12.
239. For instance, immediately prior to President George Bush’s visit, European
Commission President José Manuel Barroso warned, “‘[W]e risk losing our souls’ if the
privacy rights of individuals were ignored in the pursuit of terrorists.” Dan Bilefsky, Bank
Consortium Faces Outcry on Data Transfer, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/world/europe/28iht-suit.2071000.html.
240. See id.; Dan Bilefsky, Europeans Berate Bank Group and Overseer for U.S. Access
to Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at A15. A leading privacy rights NGO based in London,
Privacy International, filed complaints with data protection authorities in thirty-two
countries. Dan Bilefsky, Group Tries to Block Program Giving Data to U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/world/27cnd-secure.html.
241. ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE COMMISSION, supra note 221. The Commission retracted the
report two years later on grounds that surveillance operations were consistent with U.N.
security resolutions and that SWIFT had taken substantial measures after the program’s
disclosure to enhance its data protections. KÖPPEL, supra note 208, § 1.4.
242. This entailed installing a new operation center in Switzerland and then allowing
countries to decide whether they wanted their transactions to go through the European
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in January 2010,243 the United States would no longer have access to financial
transactions conducted within Europe.244 True to the words of SWIFT officials, the
new operation center opened in January 2010.245
SWIFT’s decision to shift the intra-European data out of the United States’
reach is important: it shows that red-carpet diplomacy is effective only under some
conditions. In this case, SWIFT’s reputational concerns about client privacy won
out over the Americans’ red-carpet persuasion campaign.
SWIFT’s change in policy is also important because it provides strong evidence
that SWIFT’s cooperation between 2002 and 2006 was not simply a function of legal
compulsion based on U.S. subpoenas. Before and after 2006, SWIFT officials had the
same option of insulating some or all of its data by moving it abroad. What motivated
SWIFT to insulate its data after 2006 was not a shift in the government’s legal
authority, but in SWIFT’s incentives. Before the New York Times exposé, SWIFT’s
reputation was not on the line, and there was no public pressure to reject U.S.
subpoenas. Direct diplomacy and post-9/11 allegiance, however fleeting, gave SWIFT
officials sufficient reason to cooperate. Put differently, SWIFT was legally obligated to
respond to U.S. subpoenas. But legal obligation does not fully explain why it did so.
The United States has also used direct diplomacy with foreign bank executives
in its efforts to stem the flow of money to Iran.246 Treasury officials recognized that
it would be useful to do more than rely on financial sticks and high-profile
blacklists to steer foreign banks away from their Iranian connections. In 2005,247
they began to launch an unprecedented series of diplomatic initiatives, holding
meetings directly with foreign bank officials and urging them to cut off connections
with Iran. Treasury met not only with banks that had strong U.S. ties—those with
branches or subsidiaries located in the United States—but also with banks that did

centers or the American one. Almost all countries selected the European centers. KÖPPEL,
supra note 208, § 1.5.
243. SWIFT Statement on the European Parliament’s Rejection of the Interim EU-US
Agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, SWIFT (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://www.swift.com/about_swift/legal/swift_statement_eu_parliament_rejection
[hereinafter Swift Statement].
244. Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/about_swift
/legal/terrorist_finance_tracking_program (“SEPA data are not in the scope of the EU-US
agreement. Since the implementation of SWIFT’s distributed architecture in the beginning of
2010, intra-European messages are only channelled (and archived, where applicable) in
SWIFT’s European operational centers and no longer in the US.”).
245. SWIFT Statement, supra note 243.
246. Although this discussion focuses on Iran, Treasury employed this direct diplomacy
for North Korea too, and presumably discussed both countries during the various meetings.
See Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Pursues Tactic of Financial Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006,
at A10 [hereinafter Weisman, Financial Isolation] (“In the last year, Mr. Levey has traveled to
several countries in Europe to exert pressure on Iran and to Singapore, China, Macao, Hong
Kong, Vietnam and South Korea to press banks to break their ties with North Korea.”).
247. Although journalists and congressional reports state that Treasury launched this
initiative in 2006, cables available on WikiLeaks suggest these meetings began in 2005, if not
earlier. Ambassador’s Meeting with Central Bank Governor and Ahli United Bank, WIKILEAKS
(Aug. 2, 2007, 1:32 PM), https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07MANAMA747_a.html
[hereinafter WIKILEAKS, Ambassador’s Meeting].
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not.248
While
Treasury
officials
did
not
abandon
traditional,
government-to-government diplomacy, they concentrated their efforts on direct
outreach to foreign executives.249 As with its direct diplomacy with SWIFT, the
diplomacy campaign in the Iran case was legally informal. Executive orders appear
to have generally authorized but did not specifically enumerate Treasury’s
diplomatic campaign, and Treasury’s campaign did not impose binding obligations
on participants.250
Termed the “intellectual architect”251 behind the diplomatic campaign, thenUnder Secretary Levey and his successors recognized the benefits of appealing
directly to foreign private banks, rather than approaching them indirectly by
making contacts with their governments. Foreign governments might refuse or be
reluctant to pressure their own banks into following U.S. policy, particularly
when the policy imposes high costs on banks and lacks legitimacy with domestic
publics or the governments themselves. By approaching the private sector
directly, the United States avoids putting foreign governments in the position of
having to choose sides. Former Treasury Secretary Paulson has gone further and
suggested that direct diplomacy is more effective than the traditional approach
because foreign banks may actually induce foreign governments to spring into
action: “Such voluntary implementation by the private sector in turn makes it
even more palatable for governments to impose similar measures, thus creating a
mutually reinforcing cycle of public and private action.”252 Other U.S. officials
view direct diplomacy with the private sector as more efficient. In the words of
Condoleezza Rice, “The private sector has proved ‘quicker to respond’ than
governments.”253
As far as the public record shows, such diplomatic targeting of foreign banks is
unprecedented.254 Between 2005 and 2008, Treasury officials made extensive use
of it: they “made overtures” to 145 banks in sixty countries.255 In some instances,
such as in the United Arab Emirates, they scheduled repeat visits to the same

248. For instance, OFAC officials met with Bahraini bank officials of Ahli United Bank,
id., as well as with bank officials of Kuwait Finance House. Terrorist Finance: Summary of
OFAC Director Werner’s Meetings with Kuwaiti Banks, WIKILEAKS (Sept. 28, 2005, 1:11
PM), https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KUWAIT4230_a.html.
249. As one former Treasury official later stated, “I would say that [Stuart Levey’s]
engagement over the last couple of years was probably more with bank CEOs and board
members than it was with government counterparts.” Aspen Institute, ASF 2011: Financing
Terror, YOUTUBE (July 30, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaTrnbmBUMg
(beginning at 26:20); see also FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 35–40.
250. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 789 (2002) (“The Secretary of the Treasury,
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to
take such actions . . . and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA and
UNPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.”).
251. Serrat, supra note 174, at 42.
252. Remarks by Sec’y Paulson, supra note 186.
253. Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, supra note 109.
254. Loeffler, supra note 129, at 106 (quoting Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey describing the campaign as “unprecedented, high-level
outreach to the international private sector”).
255. KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS 2013, supra note 161, at 24.
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country.256 Described by one journalist as “Stuart Levey’s War,”257 Levey himself
made more than eighty foreign trips on his own, meeting with more than sixty
different foreign bank officials.258 After Levey’s departure from Treasury for the
private sector, Treasury officials continued this practice of direct outreach. In 2010,
for instance, they conducted three weeks of meetings with senior government
officials and bank regulators, as well as the CEOs of private banks in countries
including Bahrain, Ecuador, Lebanon, and Turkey.259
The limited information available suggests that these meetings served as channels
for sharing classified information and to signal the priority the U.S. government was
giving to its Iran policy.260 To make their case to foreign banks,261 Treasury officials,
for instance, produced data showing that Bank Sepah had requested foreign banks to
strip its transactions of any identifying information, such as the bank’s name, in the
attempt to secure access to the U.S. financial system.262 They also showed documents
tracing the transfer of $50 million from the Iranian Bank Saderat through a London
subsidiary to a charity affiliated with Hezbollah in Lebanon.263
Why have foreign banks cooperated with the U.S. government’s diplomatic
outreach in the absence of a legal directive? Treasury officials offer one possible
explanation: the meetings they organize make banks aware of the reputational risks
involved in dealing with Iran. As Levey stated, “All the banks we’ve talked to are
reducing significantly their exposure to Iranian business . . . . It’s been a universal
response. They all recognize the risks—some because of what we’ve told them and
some on their own. You don’t have to be Sherlock Holmes to see the dangers.”264
Paulson echoed that sentiment: “As a result of our outreach and targeted measures,
financial institutions around the world are more sensitive than ever about the very
substantial risks posed by doing business with Iran.”265 Paulson continued, “For the

256. Id.
257. Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, supra note 109.
258. Id. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson also met with foreign bank executives in the
United States, including at the annual World Bank and IMF meeting. Loeffler, supra note
129, at 106.
259. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Concludes Three Weeks Of Global
Engagement With Governments, Private Sector on Iran (Aug. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg835.aspx.
260. FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 35–36; Kittrie, supra note 9, at 816; see also
Serrat, supra note 174, at 42.
261. Treasury officials shared this type of information with foreign governments as well,
in an effort to solicit cooperation.
262. See Cooney, supra note 137, at 8 (describing how Treasury officials used data of the
transactions of the Iranian government to persuade foreign banks to cut off their business
with Iran); Loeffler, supra note 129, at 109. This is an example where the government’s
objective of following the money served its goal of stopping the money.
263. Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, supra note 109.
264. Robin Wright, Iran Feels Pinch as Major Banks Curtail Business, WASH. POST,
Mar. 26, 2007, at A10. One State Department official stated, “It’s the most direct and
aggressive stuff we’ve got going. It delivers.” Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, supra note 109.
Henry Paulson further claims, “This is one of the most powerful actions that can be taken,
short of military action.” Id.
265. Remarks by Sec’y Paulson, supra note 186.
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most part, they are not legally required to take these steps but they have decided, as
a matter of prudence and integrity, that they do not want to be the bankers for such
a regime.”266 U.S. officials emphasize that foreign banks are moving away from
Iran based on self-interest rather than legal obligation.
While diplomatic meetings frequently provided foreign banks with new and
concrete information about ongoing illicit transactions, which may very well have
triggered banks’ reputational and market-access concerns, the mere occurrence of
such meetings may have been as important as their actual content. The willingness
of Treasury officials to fly across the globe to meet personally with foreign bank
leaders sent an unmistakably clear, if unspoken, signal that the United States was
serious about its policy to isolate Iranian banks and Iran more generally. According
to one journalist, “One of the main unspoken messages of the visits, experts say, is
that the United States government may eventually bar American banks from
working with financial institutions doing business with groups tied to terrorism.”267
Treasury officials, however, deny making any kind of implicit threat. In Paulson’s
words, “We never threaten . . . . We talk about how important it is not to violate the
rules and engage in illicit transactions.”268
At least some foreign bank executives, however, viewed their meetings with
Treasury officials not as friendly efforts at persuasion, as Paulson intimates, but as
a form of coercive diplomacy. In this view, direct diplomacy served as an implicit
threat that if the banks did not fall in line by cutting their ties with their Iranian
partners, the United States would take some form of punitive action.269 There is
evidence to support this view. In 2011, for instance, Treasury officials met with
representatives of the four largest Chinese banks to dissuade them from doing
business with Iran’s shipping industry. Treasury officials warned that if the banks
maintained their business ties, they might be cut off from the U.S. market.270
Whether motivated by direct market pressure or concerns about reputational
risk, some foreign bank officials, despite cooperating with the United States, are
resentful. One European diplomat stated, “[Foreign bank officials are] not happy
with what’s happening . . . . They complain about U.S. pressure, but accept it. They
hope it will pass soon.”271 Officials from Dubai expressed similar frustration.
According to the Central Bank governor, “Sometimes, yes, we feel that the United
States is asking too much.”272 In private discussions, bankers at Standard Chartered
put it more bluntly: “You f—ing Americans. Who are you to tell us, the rest of the
world, that we’re not going to deal with Iranians.”273

266. Id.
267. Weisman, Financial Isolation, supra note 246. Weisman goes on to note that the
diplomatic campaign has been “backed up” by specific actions such as the legal measures
discussed in the previous section. Id.
268. Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, supra note 109.
269. See id. (“Foreign bankers, however, insisted that threats were always implicit.”).
270. Serrat, supra note 174, at 42.
271. Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, supra note 109.
272. Id. The official continued, “They want results to happen immediately, yesterday
instead of today or tomorrow. They are demanding. This is what I said to Stuart Levey: ‘You
shouldn’t expect it can produce miracles in a short time.’” Id.
273. Lawrence G. Baxter, A Current Assessment of Some Extraterritorial Impacts of the
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D. Multilateralism in Disguise?
On important questions of national security, the three harnessing tactics
comprise a dollar unilateralism strategy that appears to be effective in shaping
foreign bank incentives under some circumstances (Iran) but not others
(SWIFT).274 Rather than defining efficacy broadly as whether the ultimate
objectives of the government’s policy are served, this Article prefers a narrow
definition focused on the extent to which the government’s harnessing strategy has
influenced foreign banks.
In the case of Iran, dollar unilateralism has been credited with driving foreign
banks to cut ties with the Iranian regime, and has arguably pressured the Iranian
government into negotiations over its nuclear weapons policy.275 Without more and
better data about the precise identity of the banks, it is admittedly difficult to
establish conclusively that foreign banks were responding to U.S. policy. Yet, the
evidence available indicates that the U.S. strategy had a strong influence on foreign
banks. For instance, as the government was incrementally withdrawing U-turn
exemptions and conducting direct diplomacy between 2006 and 2008, the number
of foreign banks operating in Iran dropped by more than half, from forty-six to
twenty.276 This steep decline has led one scholar to describe the government’s
harnessing strategy, and specifically its use of financial leverage to isolate targeted
countries, as the closest it has come to the “Holy Grail.”277 Anecdotal evidence also
suggests the efficacy of harnessing.278 One journalist noted, for instance, that French
Dodd-Frank Act with Special Focus on the Volcker Rule and Derivatives Regulation, 5
KOREAN J. BANKING & FIN. L. 3, 12 n.41 (2012) (quoting Order Pursuant to Banking Law
§ 39 at 5, In re Standard Chartered Bank, N.Y. Branch (N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs. Aug. 6,
2012), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SCBorder0806.pdf),
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2707/.
274. I focus on the efficacy of the government’s overall harnessing strategy, rather than
the individual tactics. It would be difficult to assess the three tactics’ individual efficacy,
given that, in the case of Iran and North Korea, the government has implemented them
concurrently. Nonetheless, there is evidence suggesting that each of the three tactics works.
For evidence on financial sticks and high-profile blacklists, see supra text accompanying
notes 155–162 and 170–178, respectively. One piece of evidence that direct diplomacy
influenced foreign bank executive calculations regarding their ties with Iran came from a
2005 meeting between OFAC officials and executives of the Bahraini bank, Ahli United
Bank (AUB). In this meeting, AUB bank officials stated that AUB would divest itself of its
one-third interest in Future Bank (a different bank, which had plans of investing in Iran)
“before jeopardizing its access to the dollar clearing system.” WIKILEAKS, Ambassador’s
Meeting, supra note 247.
275. See INT’L CRISIS GRP., MIDDLE EAST REPORT NO. 138, SPIDER WEB: THE MAKING
AND UNMAKING OF IRAN SANCTIONS 19–33 (2013) [hereinafter SPIDER WEB].
276. Steven R. Weisman, Oversight Group Warns World About Iran’s Banking System, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/world/asia/28iht-iran.5.10555242.html;
see also KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS 2013, supra note 161, at 24 (“The program convinced at
least 80 foreign banks to cease handling financial transactions with Iranian banks.”).
277. Kittrie, supra note 9, at 789.
278. For additional anecdotal suggestions that foreign firms have complied with U.S.
harnessing policy in the case of Iran, see, e.g., Thomas Erdbrink & Colum Lynch, Iran’s
Shipping Industry Wilts Under Sanctions; Western Insurers, Abiding by U.S. Laws, Withhold
Coverage, WASH. POST, July 21, 2010, at A13; Glenn R. Simpson & John R. Wilke, Sanction
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banks stopped offering letters of credit for trade involving Iran and quotes an oil
refiner as stating that “it is today impossible more or less in Europe, with a couple of
exceptions, to get a letter of credit.”279 Banks in the United Arab Emirates also
reportedly refused to issue letters of credit.280 “The momentum,” another journalist
claims, “surprised even Levey.”281
One explanation for the apparent effectiveness of dollar unilateralism is that it is
simply multilateralism in disguise.282 Treasury officials state that they have gone to
great lengths to secure the cooperation and support of foreign governments.283 Both
the European Union and U.N., for instance, have imposed restrictive conditions on
Iran that surely contributed to that country’s isolation.284 Although it is undeniable
that international support has strengthened the impact of U.S. policies, it would be
a mistake to assume that U.S. harnessing is simply a form of masked
multilateralism for two reasons.
First, U.N. sanctions on Iran have been much narrower than U.S. restrictions, and
those sanctions that are in place were largely a product of U.S. influence.285 The
European Union’s “restrictive measures,”286 while more extensive than U.N.
sanctions, have not influenced Iranian banks at every juncture. For example, after
being blacklisted by Treasury, Bank Saderat’s correspondent bank relationships
reportedly fell from twenty-nine to eight.287 As one researcher noted, this is a telling
sign that banks were being influenced specifically by Treasury’s policy, since neither
Threat Prompts Big Firms to Cut Iran Ties, WALL ST. J. E. EDITION, Jan. 31, 2006, at A3.
279. Mark Trevelyan, More Companies Suspend Business with Iran, INT’L HERALD TRIB.
(U.K.), Jan. 17, 2008, at 15.
280. Id.
281. Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, supra note 109.
282. Government officials disagree on whether U.S. policy even qualifies as
unilateralism, with some arguing that it has undermined the U.N., and others insisting that it
has buttressed U.N. policy. See Hakimi, supra note 5, at 140 nn.215 & 217 (citing a French
official’s perspective that unilateralism is circumventing U.N. policies and a U.S. official’s
statement that unilateral action is complementing U.N. policies).
283. “One of the things that we work on very hard is to bring together international
consensus, international coalitions in the exercise of financial pressure, in part because it
makes it that much more effective, and in in [sic] part so that we do not encounter any
pulling back from the U.S. financial system.” Mauldin, supra note 125.
284. The most important of these restrictive measures was enacted by the European
Union in January 2012, imposing a comprehensive embargo on the purchase, import, or
transportation of Iranian crude oil, petroleum, and petrochemical products. This embargo
made it exceedingly difficult for tankers transporting Iranian oil to obtain private insurance.
Jeffrey J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Is the Third Decade a Charm?, 47 BUS.
ECON. 190 (2012). SWIFT, under pressure from the European Union—which itself was
arguably under U.S. pressure—also barred the Central Bank of Iran and more than twenty
Iranian banks from using SWIFT messaging services for their international transactions. Giri
Rajendran, Financial Blockades: Reserve Currencies as Instruments of Coercion, in THE
POWER OF CURRENCIES AND CURRENCIES OF POWER 87, 94 (Alan Wheatley ed., 2013); see
also SPIDER WEB, supra note 275, at 13–14.
285. See SPIDER WEB, supra note 275, at 14–15.
286. The European Union uses the terms “sanctions” and “restrictive measures”
interchangeably. Sanctions Policy, EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, http://eeas.europa.eu
/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm.
287. Jacobson, supra note 191, at 76–77.
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the U.N. nor the European Union placed any kind of restrictions on Bank Saderat.288
Moreover, even when E.U. courts have invalidated specific designations of Iranian
banks,289 there is no evidence to suggest that European banks have considered
reestablishing business connections with Iranian entities. European banks may of
course have refrained, expecting the European Union to simply redesignate the
Iranian banks.290 But even without such designations, European banks would be
unlikely to revive business ties given that U.S. policies are still in effect.291
Second, and perhaps most importantly, when important governments have
resisted U.S. policy, the United States has—even while attempting to secure their
cooperation—used dollar unilateralism to circumvent them. For instance,
possessing strong ties to Iran, Turkey has explicitly stated that it has no intention of
adhering to unilateral U.S restrictions. On the brink of being targeted for a new
wave of direct diplomacy by the U.S. government, the Turkish Trade Minister
criticized the United States for pressuring Turkish banks and stated his opposition
in unyielding terms: “[W]e cannot tolerate it.”292 The Chinese government has also
publicly and repeatedly opposed the government’s “wanton unilateralist practice.”293
Other countries have expressed no more than reluctant support, most likely the result
of quiet coercion.294 As the United Arab Emirates’ minister of economy Sheikha
Lubna al Qasimi explains, the United Arab Emirates’ and Iran’s economic ties are
longstanding and run deep. “At the end of the day, Iran is a neighbor.”295
Underscoring what makes harnessing foreign banks so appealing to the U.S.
government, in each of these cases—Turkey, China, and the United Arab
Emirates—foreign banks have claimed that, in contrast to their governments’
positions, they are adhering to U.S. regulations. Turkish bankers have noted in

288. Id.
289. E.g., Joined Cases T-4/11 & T-5/11, Export Development Bank of Iran v. Council,
2013 O.J. (C 304) 11; Case T-494/10, Bank Saderat Iran v. Council, 2013 O.J. (C 79) 12;
Case T-13/11, Post Bank Iran v. Council, 2013 O.J. (C 304) 13; Case T-15/11, Sina Bank v.
Council, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 661 (Dec. 11, 2012); Case T-390/08, Bank Melli
Iran v. Council, 2009 E.C.R. II-3967.
290. See Benoît Faucon & Laurence Norman, EU Shifts Tactics to Bolster Iran
Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2013, at A9.
291. See James Kanter, Iran Ruling in Europe Draws Anger from U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 2013, at A4.
292. Jay Solomon & Marc Champion, U.S. Approaches Turkey on Iran Sanctions, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 19, 2010, at A13.
293. MOFCOM Says China Opposes Recent US Sanctions, POL’Y & REG. REP., Feb. 15,
2013 (article on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
294. For instance, following the State Department’s threat that it would designate the
United Arab Emirates as a country that provides nuclear technology to Iran (a “destination of
diversion concern”), the United Arab Emirates began to support U.S. policies and U.N.
sanctions. This support was not merely rhetorical. The U.A.E. government adopted new
measures restricting ties with Iran, including tightening customs regulations and pressuring
its own banks to comply with both U.S. and U.N. policies. Kambiz Foroohar, Dubai Helps
Iran Evade Sanctions as Smugglers Ignore U.S. Laws, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2010, 5:27
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=av5smtYe_DDA.
295. Farnaz Fassihi & Chip Cummins, Cat and Mouse: Iranians Scheme to Elude
Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, at A1.
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private conversation that Turkish banks with U.S. shareholders have “cut back
sharply” their ties with Iran.296 Chinese lawyers have reported that Chinese
companies, especially banks, are taking significant measures to comply with U.S.
laws. One lawyer in Shanghai pointed to the example of an Iranian company that
was unable to invest in China because local banks refused to open an account for
it.297 Even in Dubai, referred to as “Iran’s offshore business center,”298 banks have
been cutting back. For example, one large Dubai-based bank announced that, in
response to U.S. policies, it was closing down all accounts with Iranian banks.299
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the effectiveness of the
government’s new harnessing strategy in influencing the decisions of foreign
banks. Although the government’s dollar unilateralism has influenced some foreign
bank dealings with North Korea, it is a less powerful strategy than in the Iran case,
partly because North Korean banks are not as integrated into global financial
markets.300 Furthermore, the SWIFT case demonstrates that the three tactics of
dollar unilateralism do not always work. In that particular case, the United States
had minimal financial leverage since SWIFT is not a traditional bank that accepts
deposits or issues credit. High-profile blacklisting would have backfired because
SWIFT’s reputation hangs on its commitment to data privacy and banking secrecy.
Although direct diplomacy appears to have been effective in eliciting SWIFT’s
support under the right circumstances, its limitations became evident once the
intelligence operation was made public.301

296. Jay Solomon & Marc Champion, U.S. Envoy to Meet with Iran’s Neighbors, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 19, 2010, 12:01 AM, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023034961
04575560240107312672.
297. Raymond Barrett & Joy C. Shaw, New Iran Sanctions Increases OFAC Compliance
Burden for Chinese Companies, POL’Y & REG. REP., Jan. 23, 2013.
298. Foroohar, supra note 294 (quoting Afshin Molavi, a fellow at the Washington-based
New America Foundation).
299. Chip Cummins & Jay Solomon, U.A.E. Cuts off Ties to Iran Banks, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 2010, 12:01 AM, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703298504575
534041013995702.html.
300. Kittrie, supra note 9, at 793. Other reasons for the limits of unilateralism in the
North Korea case are that, compared to Iran, North Korea is less susceptible to domestic
pressure, see Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland, Sanctioning North Korea: The Political
Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation 22–23 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ.,
Working Paper No. WP 09-4, 2009) (“The North Korean economy is indeed becoming more
open, but the leadership remains highly ambivalent about this development and about reform
more generally and has shown little interest in economic carrots as a result.”), and more
invested in maintaining its nuclear program, see FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 10.
The fact that U.S. and U.N. policies have not been as numerous or aggressive toward North
Korea as toward Iran may also be a factor. See GO MYONG-HYUN, ASAN INST. FOR POLICY
STUDIES, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 82, NORTH KOREA AS IRAN’S COUNTERFACTUAL: A COMPARISON
OF
IRAN
AND
NORTH
KOREA
SANCTIONS
(2013),
available
at
http://en.asaninst.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IssueBrief_82.pdf.
301. Of the three tactics, the efficacy of direct diplomacy is the most difficult to assess.
Information about what goes on in closed-door meetings is difficult to come by. Yet, direct
diplomacy allows for narrowly tailoring policy to each context, which may help explain
Treasury’s enthusiasm for using it.
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III. IMPLICATIONS
Dollar unilateralism offers insights for both domestic and international law
scholars working on U.S. security. It challenges the widespread assumption in
international legal scholarship that, in the case of cross-border security threats,
globalization has rendered unilateralism increasingly obsolete. Instead, drawing on
lessons from the cases of Iran, North Korea, and SWIFT, I propose three conditions
that likely influence the efficacy of harnessing foreign private actors.
Yet even when effective, dollar unilateralism raises unresolved political
accountability concerns, both at home and internationally. Rather than offer an
aggregate normative assessment, I suggest the government’s precise tactics matter.
For domestic affairs, accountability concerns are more acute when the
government’s tactics are legally informal. By contrast, in international affairs,
informal tactics allow for specific forms of foreign government influence and
oversight, but favor powerful states that already have some leverage over the
United States. These tactics, moreover, still fall short of international and
multilateral legal processes, which are better able to secure U.S. accountability to
weaker actors, even as they are themselves no panacea. I thus argue that dollar
unilateralism is a powerful strategy under specific conditions, yet also opens the
door to new accountability gaps, both domestically and internationally.
A. Conditions for Efficacy
The efficacy of dollar unilateralism is conditional. As before, I use a narrow
definition of efficacy, focusing on the government’s ability to influence foreign
banks, and foreign firms more generally.302 I highlight three factors that are likely
to influence policy efficacy: the structure of the industry that the government seeks
to harness; the international acceptability of the government’s policy goals that
harnessing aims to serve; and bargaining asymmetries between the government and
the industry targeted for harnessing.
First, effectiveness of the government’s new unilateral strategy depends partly
on the structure of the industry. Placed at the center of the global economy, finance
is of primary importance to the functioning of international and national markets,
comparable perhaps only to telecommunications and energy. Banks, for instance,
have greater access to and influence over foreign private actors than do
multinational corporations in manufacturing. Indeed, in the Iran case, the U.S.
government has been able to use the centrality of the U.S. finance sector to disrupt
two other pivotal markets: oil and insurance.303 In the banking industry, moreover,

302. See supra text accompanying note 274. Therefore, this Part does not address a whole
set of interesting questions related to efficacy, including the ability of the government to lift
sanctions once imposed, the potential for foreign government retaliation against U.S. policy,
or emulation of it, and broader questions about the efficacy of relying on targeting national
economies (or particular sectors) as a strategy to pressure nondemocratic regimes.
303. See Rajendran, supra note 284, at 94–95 (noting that banking restrictions buttressed
restrictions on both the insurance and oil sectors). For a discussion of how banking is deeply
connected to these industries, see id. at 94–96. It is worth noting that the importance of
industry structure depends partly on the nature of the targeted entity or regime and its own
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sensitivity to reputational risk arguably provides a vital channel cementing further
cross-border connections and aligning bank interests with the government’s policy
objectives.304 Thus, even when the executive branch granted waivers to countries in
the process of reducing their oil dependency on Iran, foreign banks still refrained
from processing such transactions. The banks deemed both the reputational risks
and the compliance costs too high.305
With its extensive reach over foreign private actors, the telecommunications
industry is also positioned at the center of the global economy. This makes
organizations like SWIFT and telecommunications giants like Google or Verizon
appealing targets for harnessing. Yet, as the SWIFT case illustrates,
telecommunication companies have reputational pressures to protect consumer
privacy that may differ from the pressure on banks, and telecommunication
incentives can thus clash with the government’s surveillance agenda. In that case,
direct diplomacy worked with SWIFT officials when the surveillance operation
was covert, but became less effective once the operation was exposed. High-profile
blacklisting of noncooperative companies will also be less likely to lead to shaming
and tainting of the company, and more likely to backfire, pushing telecom
companies to publicly resist U.S. harnessing efforts.306
The acceptability of policy goals that the government seeks to advance is a
second factor that affects the efficacy of the new U.S. unilateral strategy. When the
United States pursues goals that are widely accepted by foreign governments and
corporations, harnessing will be easier to implement. For instance, in contrast to its
endorsement of U.S. policy on Iran, the European Union circumscribed the U.S.
government’s ability to harness SWIFT. U.S. surveillance operations violate
strongly held European privacy norms. The European Union has therefore placed
significant pressure on the United States, forcing it, in the words of one U.S.
official, to make “difficult” and “substantial” concessions during negotiations about
collaboration between the United States and SWIFT.307 Under pressure from the
European Union (and particularly the European Parliament), the United States now
allows an E.U. official to monitor U.S. searches of encrypted data, and grants
Europol (the European Union’s police agency) the authority to block data transfers
from Europe to the United States.308
dependence on the industry. In the case of North Korea, U.S. harnessing of foreign banks
may be less effective partly because North Korea is much less integrated into the global
economy than most countries.
304. See Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo & Loriana
Pelizzon, Econometric Measures of Connectedness and Systemic Risk in the Finance and
Insurance Sectors, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 535, 555 (2012).
305. Rajendran, supra note 284, at 94.
306. In response to the 2013 disclosures of telecommunication firms’ collaboration with
NSA surveillance, for instance, U.S. companies have gone to great lengths to repair possible
reputational damage, such as requesting the release of classified documents that may shed a
more favorable light on their cooperation with government agencies.
307. SWIFT Progress? Europe Backs New EU-US Data Sharing Deal, SPIEGEL ONLINE
(June 25, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/swift-progress-europe
-backs-new-eu-us-data-sharing-deal-a-702841.html [hereinafter SWIFT Progress?]; see also
KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22030, U.S.-EU COOPERATION AGAINST
TERRORISM 9–10 (2013).
308. SWIFT Progress?, supra note 307. The backlash following the exposure of the
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It would be mistaken, however, to overemphasize the need for buy-in from
foreign governments. Even when the United States goes to great lengths to secure
the support of foreign governments,309 the primary appeal of this new form of
unilateralism lies in one simple fact: the U.S. government does not rely on foreign
government support to the same extent as when it proceeds by traditional bilateral
or multilateral channels. The U.S. government’s reaction to European Court of
Justice (ECJ) rulings invalidating E.U. designations of Iranian banks suggests this
to be the case even in its relations with the European Union. On the same day that
the court struck down E.U. designations on evidentiary grounds, Treasury officials
employed financial sticks, adding six Iranian individuals and four new companies
to its SDN list.310
The third feature likely to influence the efficacy of harnessing involves
market-based bargaining asymmetries between the government and individual
foreign firms, as well as the foreign sector more generally, which the government
seeks to enlist. The government does not simply exert uniform influence over all
foreign banks, relying on the carrot of market access or the stick of legal sanction.
As the “too big to prosecute” experience during the financial crisis demonstrated,
U.S. banks are too closely intertwined with large foreign partners for the government
to deny these partner banks market access.311 The U.S. government depends on banks
like HSBC almost as much as such banks depend on U.S. markets. This
interdependency constrains the government in implementing its various harnessing
tactics.
U.S. dominance over global finance, moreover, does not translate equally across
all sectors. Compared to finance, for example, foreign producers are less dependent
on the U.S. textile, energy, or even telecommunications markets. Following recent
disclosures about the NSA’s spying program, some experts predicted that U.S.
cloud providers would lose about ten percent of their foreign customers to
European and Asian competitors.312
U.S.-SWIFT operation may foreshadow what is to come in the wake of the 2013 revelations
of NSA spying. For example, German officials have demanded that the U.S. government
enter into a formal agreement prohibiting future spying among allied countries. Furthermore,
in retaliation, the European Union has threatened to cut off U.S. access to SWIFT data
entirely and to withhold data about airline passengers. Adrian Croft, EU Threatens to
Suspend Data-Sharing with US over Spying Reports, REUTERS, July 5, 2013, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/05/usa-security-eu-idUSL5N0FB1YY20130705.
309. See, e.g., FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 36; Mauldin, supra note 125.
310. Kanter, supra note 291; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Exposes Iranian
Attempts to Evade Oil Sanctions (Sept. 6, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press
-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2158.aspx.
311. E.g., Greg Farrell & Tiffany Kary, Standard Chartered Still Faces Fed Probes After
N.Y. Deal, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2012-08-14/standard-chartered-faces-fed-probes-after-n-y-deal.html.
312. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, The Lunacy of Trying to Avoid NSA Spying by Moving
E-mail and Cloud out of the US, ZDNET (Aug. 27, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www.zdnet.com
/the-lunacy-of-trying-to-avoid-nsa-spying-by-moving-e-mail-and-cloud-out-of-the-us
-7000019908. Other experts suggest that the losses could be even greater. E.g., Charles
Babcock, NSA’s Prism Could Cost U.S. Cloud Companies $45 Billion, INFO. WEEK (Aug.
15, 2013, 7:47 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/cloud-computing/infrastructure/nsas
-prism-could-cost-us-cloud-companies/240159980.

344

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:293

Because they do not operate in isolation from one another, these three factors
should be considered together when evaluating the potential efficacy of the
government’s harnessing strategy. If the United States enjoys significant bargaining
leverage over a foreign sector, it can afford to pay less attention to the international
acceptability of its objectives than if its bargaining leverage is weak. For instance,
U.S. attempts in the 1990s to harness foreign firms—not banks—to isolate Cuba
were significantly undercut by E.U. opposition.313 Without E.U. support, the
government was unable to influence foreign firms trading with Cuba. But the Cuba
case did not simply underscore the need for E.U. backing. Rather, it demonstrated
the importance of international support when the United States has less bargaining
power over foreign firms. Having recognized its leverage over foreign finance, the
United States has become less dependent on the European Union even as it
understands the political and legitimacy benefits of E.U. support.314
It is the interaction between these three factors, more than their independent
effects, that is relevant for assessing the potential efficacy of this new unilateral
strategy for addressing future transnational challenges. Regardless of where a given
U.S. policy falls along each of these three factors and how the factors interact, the
central point remains: despite a popular assumption that multilateral cooperation is
necessary for addressing cross-border problems, the U.S. government’s recent turn to
foreign banks suggests that new types of unilateralism—not just dollar unilateralism,
but other forms too—are possible and, under certain circumstances, effective.
B. Implications for Accountability
Dollar unilateralism, and the specific tactics the government uses to implement
it, raises concerns about government accountability, both within the United States
and globally.315 I discuss these two contexts in turn. Similar to executive-private
handshake agreements used for surveillance operations,316 informal tactics enlisting
foreign banks create troubling accountability gaps in domestic politics. But
domestic law scholars have expressed much less concern about informal harnessing
of foreign firms. This silence may stem from a lack of awareness and also from the
fact that the government has, thus far, used its tactics conservatively. Furthermore,
Congress and the Executive have both supported dollar unilateralism in relations
with Iran and North Korea.317 This silence is shortsighted. The tactics of dollar
unilateralism may well evolve into a broader practice and the alignment of
congressional-executive support may only be temporary. International law scholars
have also been relatively quiet when it comes to evaluating dollar unilateralism,

313. Supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.
314. See Rajendran, supra note 284, at 98 (“Whereas the ability of the U.S. to impose
biting trade sanctions has waned, the international role of the dollar, bolstered by the pivotal
position of the currency within the global financial architecture, has increased the
effectiveness of financial sanctions.”).
315. Accountability is only one yardstick by which to assess the government’s new
strategy. In addition to efficacy, other dimensions include legality and legitimacy. A full
normative assessment would need to consider these as well.
316. For discussion of handshake agreements, see supra text accompanying notes 38–44.
317. See Kittrie, supra note 9, at 789–93.
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both as an overall strategy and in its individual tactics. The novelty of the
government’s strategy explains this silence, as does the general, if still emerging,
view that dollar unilateralism is valid under international law. Until assessments of
dollar and other forms of unilateralism recognize and consider carefully the diverse
range of unilateral tactics the government deploys—both formal and informal—they
will remain incomplete. And even as dollar unilateralism does not appear to violate
international law, it subverts international legal processes of participation and
consent, creating new gaps in U.S. accountability.318
I focus here on political accountability and adopt a definition that can be applied
both domestically (from the perspective of the U.S. public) and internationally
(from the perspective of other governments or their nationals). I emphasize two
conditions: (1) accountability as managerial oversight, and (2) accountability as
redress.319 Managerial oversight requires that an “authoritative individual or entity”
evaluates the government’s actions and ensures that it obeys relevant rules.320 It is
forward-looking, ongoing, and requires access to information about policy
implementation. Redress accountability requires that an authority be able to
penalize the government if it violates relevant rules.321 It is backward-looking and
involves being able to sanction or seek remedy from the government for a specific
act at a discrete point in time.322 I focus specifically on legal redress.
Domestically, the government’s use of informal harnessing—high-profile
blacklists and direct diplomacy—diminishes managerial and redress accountability.
To be sure, legal formality is no guarantee of accountability. Financial sticks,
formal both in source (congressional or regulatory actions) and form (imposing
binding legal obligations), have nonetheless been sharply criticized for a lack of
oversight over Treasury323 and limited access to remedy.324 Yet, even if weak in

318. See Krisch, supra note 62, at 24–25 (discussing how the turn to informal law,
minilateralism, and unilateralism subverts “the consensual structure of international law”).
319. This two-prong definition is taken from Laura A. Dickinson, Privatization and
Accountability, 7 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 101 (2011) [hereinafter Dickinson, Privatization].
For comprehensive discussion of the different forms of accountability, see id. at 109–11
(defining democratic, contractual, and internal institutional accountability), and Robert O.
Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force, 24 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1121, 1130–34 (2003) (defining eight accountability mechanisms: hierarchical,
supervisory, electoral, fiscal, legal, market, participatory, and public reputational
accountability). For a critique of these understandings as overly broad, see Richard B.
Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability,
Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 252–55 (2014).
320. Dickinson, Privatization, supra note 319, at 103.
321. Id.
322. The two forms of accountability interact but are independent: redress accountability
may have a deterrent effect and promote managerial accountability, and managerial
accountability may encourage mechanisms of redress. Id.
323. E.g., Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted,
Non-Custodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 336–44 (2014); Vanessa Ortblad,
Comment, Criminal Prosecution in Sheep’s Clothing: The Punitive Effects of OFAC
Freezing Sanctions, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1439 (2008).
324. See generally, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY
AREA, THE OFAC LIST: DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES IN DESIGNATION AND DELISTING (2014)
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practice, in theory at least, the formal nature of financial sticks provides for de jure
mechanisms of both oversight and redress.325
By contrast, high-profile blacklists—formal in source, but not content326—allow
for some managerial accountability, but limited redress accountability. Section 311
of the Patriot Act provides for ex ante accountability partly by including a list of
jurisdictional and institutional factors that Treasury must consider when
blacklisting an entity or region, and by requiring Treasury to issue a finding that
describes the alleged activities of the blacklisted entity and the jurisdictional factors
that it considered in reaching its finding.327 Treasury, moreover, is required to
publish in the Federal Register its finding and notice of proposed rulemaking, and
to consider comments before proceeding to use a financial stick in the form of a
final rule that imposes special measures.328 Paradoxically, the very features that
enhance Treasury’s managerial accountability—ensuring that Treasury’s findings
are widely publicized and open to public scrutiny—are what constitute the act of
blacklisting in the first place. Thus, while requirements for public scrutiny may
increase Treasury’s accountability, they also inflict immediate damage on the
designated entity as it comes under the public spotlight. As with financial sticks,
section 311’s oversight mechanisms can arguably be criticized for being quite
weak, but not for lacking such mechanisms entirely.
The more pressing problem with high-profile backlists concerns access to
redress.329 Even though Treasury, when blacklisting, simply names an entity
(discussing the limited access to remedy for entities listed as Specially Designated Global
Terrorists). In Europe, similar critiques about lack of evidentiary basis have led the ECJ to
invalidate a range of designations, but with little practical effect: the European Union
redesignated banks under a broader category, making evidentiary challenges even more
difficult. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
325. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), “[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
326. As a reminder, this Article defines high-profile blacklisting as the simple act of naming
an entity though a proposed rulemaking, without the additional, optional step of imposing special
measures though adoption of a final rule (which would be a financial stick). It is thus formal in
source (section 311 of the Patriot Act), but not content (no legally binding obligations).
327. 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(c) (2012).
328. Id. § 5318A(a)(3). Compared to that of financial sticks, the managerial accountability
of high-profile blacklists is weaker. For instance, under section 311 of the Patriot Act,
Treasury is not required to consult with other federal agencies at the first step of blacklisting
an entity as a primary money-laundering concern. But the provision does mandate such
consultations when Treasury decides to, at the second step, deploy a financial stick through
the imposition of special measures—either at the time a proposed rulemaking is issued (for up
to 120 days), or after a final rulemaking. Treasury must “consult with the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other appropriate Federal banking
agency, . . . the Secretary of State, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, the National Credit Union Administration Board,” and other
agencies the Treasury deems appropriate. Id. § 5318A(a)(4)(A).
329. The relative difficulty of redress for informal actions is evident in BDA’s decision
to file a petition alleging violations of the APA and constitutional due process only for
Treasury’s 2007 final rule designating BDA as a primary money-laundering concern, even
though BDA made clear in its petition that the monetary damage of Treasury’s actions
occurred following its 2005 blacklisting, two years before the final rule was issued. Its
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without adopting a final rule, U.S. and foreign banks have been quick to cut off ties
with the blacklisted bank. Without Treasury formally requiring them to do so (as in
the case of financial sticks), it is more difficult for a blacklisted bank (or its
business partner) to obtain legal redress and repair its reputation for two reasons:
(1) the blacklisted bank (or its business partners) may have a harder time
establishing that it has been harmed, and that Treasury caused the harm, than if
Treasury had required banks to cut business ties by issuing a final rule;330 and (2)
the blacklisted entity may have a harder time getting equitable relief, as it cannot
ask courts to invalidate the final rule since no final rule was issued.331 By contrast,
with a formal obligation requiring U.S. entities to cut ties, a blacklisted entity can
request that a court invalidate Treasury’s final rule. It can thus use the court to send
a signal that it has been unjustifiably turned into a “financial pariah.”332
From the perspective of political accountability, direct diplomacy is more
problematic than high-profile blacklists since its informal nature in source and
content makes the achievement of both managerial and redress accountability
particularly difficult. In contrast to financial sticks and high-profile blacklists, no
formal laws or regulations detail the jurisdictional or institutional factors that
Treasury must consider when engaging in direct diplomacy. There are no
requirements that Treasury announce that it is holding meetings, much less disclose
the content of the meetings, and no opportunities for public feedback or
commentary. Additionally, since Treasury does not impose legal obligations on
foreign banks when it conducts direct diplomacy, there is no basis for formal
redress either, whether by an entity that is targeted by Treasury for participating in
such meetings, or by an entity that is the topic of such meetings.
Dollar unilateralism also presents important challenges to U.S. managerial and
redress accountability at the global level. The traits that make these tactics so
appealing for the U.S. government render them problematic internationally: they
enable the United States to circumvent traditional international and multilateral
legal processes of participation and consent, such as those at the U.N.333 To be sure,
one could defend the government’s tactics on grounds that they are valid under
petition focused on the final rule most likely because proving injury and obtaining equitable
relief is easier with Treasury’s formal action. See Complaint ¶ 33, Banco Delta Asia,
S.A.R.L. v. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, No. 1:13-cv-00333 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2013).
330. To establish standing, the blacklisted entity must demonstrate that it was harmed and
that the agency caused the harmful actions of the third party. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 78 (1978). Courts are cautious to hold agencies accountable for “the unfettered choices
made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate
discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562
(quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Although a blacklisted entity may have indeed suffered injury by a third-party bank,
this harm was triggered due to the Treasury’s preliminary finding and proposed rulemaking.
Because Treasury had yet to take any final action against the blacklisted entity, it may have a
more difficult time establishing that it has been harmed because of Treasury’s action.
331. Standing also requires that the injury be redressable by the relief sought. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561.
332. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR, supra note 118, at 53; see also supra Part II.B.
333. This move away from international legal processes is part of a broader trend among
states. See generally Krisch, supra note 62.
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international law in both substance and procedure.334 Although intended to
influence foreign private actors, the U.S. government’s use of financial sticks is
based on territorial connections and does not clearly contravene jurisdictional
rules.335 International law, moreover, does not prohibit governments from simply
naming foreign entities as posing criminal risks, nor does it forbid governments
from launching systematic diplomacy campaigns with foreign private actors, either
at home or abroad. One could further point to substantial international and
multilateral support for U.S. policy on Iran and North Korea.336 The U.N. Security
Council, for instance, has arguably implicitly authorized governments to take such
measures against these two countries.337
But it would be mistaken to equate the legality of the U.S. policies and the presence
of multilateral support with political accountability. International legality is neither
“the final arbiter of legitimacy”338 nor the uncompromising guarantor of
accountability. Even conceding its legality under international law, the U.S.
government’s avoidance of international multilateral procedures limits managerial and
redress accountability, albeit to varying degrees. Different from the domestic context,
tactics that are legally formal in source—financial sticks and high-profile blacklists—
weaken the government’s managerial accountability in the international context:
foreign governments are ill positioned to evaluate, much less to influence, ex ante U.S.
legislative and regulatory processes that seek to deploy foreign banks for national
security purposes, except when the U.S. government invites them into the process.
Informal tactics, by contrast, allow for at least some managerial accountability
since the Executive has more flexibility in deciding whether, when, and how to
implement its policy. With direct diplomacy, for instance, the U.S. government has
generally engaged foreign government officials, requesting their permission to hold

334. Some might suggest that U.S. economic restrictions violate WTO law, but others could
point to the national security exception. See Shailja Singh, WTO Compatibility of United
States’ Secondary Sanctions Relating to Petroleum Transactions with Iran 2–4 (Ctr. for WTO
Studies,
Working
Paper
No.
CWS/WP/200/1,
2012),
available
at
http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf.
335. While some nonetheless consider U.S. policies extraterritorial, see, e.g., Alex Lakatos
& Jan Blöchliger, The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti-Terrorist Finance Laws, 3 GESKR
344 (2009) (Ger.), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/bc8282784516-41ea-bc07-5cbcf909be56/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6746390a-c4f7-46fe-afb3
-0a9b3cc7cccb/05_Lakatos_Bloechliger.pdf, the U.S. government refutes this position. As
David Cohen, Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, stated in a
2014 interview, “None of our authorities are extraterritorial. They all operate on U.S.
institutions and U.S. persons and activity in the United States.” Mauldin, supra note 125.
336. See Krisch, supra note 62, at 23 (noting that the U.S. government’s use of financial
sticks “could raise concerns on jurisdictional grounds . . . [y]et the permissive regime of
Financing Convention and SC resolutions, coupled with favourable political circumstances,
seems to have led to widespread acquiescence”).
337. This view would be consistent with the notion of “channeled unilateralism,” in
which the multilateral system uses unilateralism as an enforcement mechanism for
international law. Supra note 64 and accompanying text.
338. Alvarez, Multilateralism and its Discontents, supra note 63, at 393.
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meetings with foreign bank executives.339 In theory, foreign officials can prohibit
such meetings on their territory or insist on being present.
Although at the global level the United States is generally more accountable for
its informal rather than formal tactics, this accountability is still weaker than the
managerial accountability that can be established by multilateral institutions,
despite the fact that these institutions have important accountability gaps of their
own.340 At multilateral venues such as the U.N. and the FATF, foreign governments
may question and evaluate U.S. proposals; in response the United States must, at
minimum, articulate a rationale for its policies, justify its selection of targets, and
engage in bargaining and debate.341 By contrast, when dealing with dollar
unilateralism, foreign governments may be able to influence U.S. tactics only in a
piecemeal and ad hoc fashion. Their ability to do so, moreover, will be a function of
leverage over the United States: powerful states may be able to push back on U.S.
tactics, while weaker states will be hard pressed to resist. When powerful states
support dollar unilateralism, the mechanisms for U.S. accountability globally become
even more elusive. While scholars and policymakers may be reassured by E.U.-U.S.
alignment on foreign policy issues, from the perspective of weaker states, E.U.-U.S.
alignment likely renders the possibility of accountability ever more remote.
Compared to accountability established at the U.N., redress accountability in the
United States is also limited, for both foreign nationals and foreign governments.
Redress for foreign entities is particularly difficult with respect to the government’s
informal tactics. But its formal tactics also are relatively difficult to challenge. By
contrast, the U.N. Security Council, for all its limitations,342 has responded to

339. See FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 28.
340. For scholarship discussing accountability gaps of multilateral institutions, see
generally Marieke de Goede, Blacklisting and the Ban: Contesting Targeted Sanctions in
Europe, 42 SECURITY DIALOGUE 499 (2011) (critiquing the European Union); Hayes, supra
note 47 (critiquing FATF); Elizabeth Clark Hersey, Note, No Universal Target: Distinguishing
Between Terrorism and Human Rights Violations in Targeted Sanctions Regimes, 38 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 1231 (2013) (critiquing the U.N.). For critiques of multilateral organizations from the
perspective of “disregard,” rather than accountability, see generally Stewart, supra note 319;
see also id. at 229 (critiquing U.N. sanctioning and listing procedures).
341. Stewart terms this as “reason giving” and views it as a mechanism to allow weaker
actors—those who are disregarded by multilateral decision-making processes—to
understand, evaluate, and address the actions of decision makers. Stewart, supra note 319, at
264–65. Even when the United States has been the driving force behind U.N. policies on Iran
and North Korea, it has not been able to push its views and interests at every juncture: U.N.
restrictive measures are much narrower than those in the United States. Joy Gordon,
Crippling Iran: The U.N. Security Council and the Tactic of Deliberate Ambiguity, 44 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 973, 984 (2013), and, during U.N. debates, countries have both challenged and resisted
U.S. attempts to expand them. See Willem van Kemenade, China vs. the Western Campaign for
Iran Sanctions, WASH. Q., July 2010, at 99 (2010) (discussing opposition by China, Turkey,
and Brazil).
342. For example, the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program, enacted to allow the Iraqi government
to exchange oil for food and medical supplies, was ultimately marred by corruption. Amy
Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 516–17 (2011) (discussing the U.N.
Oil-for-Food Program); see also Stewart, supra note 319, at 229 (critiquing the lack of
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public criticism by attempting to improve access to remedy to those injured by its
sanctions policies.343 And compared to the United States, the U.N. has gone to
significantly greater lengths in implementing reforms.344 Foreign governments
could conceivably file claims at the WTO or International Court of Justice against
the United States, but since U.S. tactics are not in clear violation of international
law, such action would be unlikely to get very far.
The perceived legality of U.S. tactics and widespread support for U.S. goals of
isolating Iran and North Korea and tracking illicit financial flows may be,
paradoxically, the greatest barrier to U.S. political accountability, both domestically
and internationally. Criticism has been scarce, and the United States has not had to
defend its methods—despite the fact that some actors are now paying a very heavy
humanitarian price,345 and that such methods would likely be viewed as deeply
troubling if implemented on a broad scale.
This discussion of weak U.S. accountability is not a pollyannaish call for
discarding dollar unilateralism, an innovative and powerful strategy. Rather it
highlights an urgent need to debate and perhaps institutionalize procedures that
mitigate emerging gaps in U.S. accountability in both domestic and global
contexts.346 While calls for accountability, for other issues, may well be “everpresent mantras,”347 and “all the rage,”348 in the case of dollar unilateralism, they
are far too rare. And while public debate is hardly an answer, it is a first step both
for engaging the government about dollar unilateralism and for evaluating the need
to establish new mechanisms that provide some form of oversight.

procedural safeguards in U.N. sanctions and refugee policies); Hersey, supra note 340
(discussing human rights issues linked to U.N. sanction policy).
343. See, e.g., Craig Forcese & Kent Roach, Limping into the Future: The U.N. 1267
Terrorism Listing Process at the Crossroads, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 217, 221–27
(2010); Stewart, supra note 319, at 223. For recent reforms made in response to litigation,
including the requirement that a summary of reasons for listing a person or entity must be
provided to the listed person or entity, see id. at 243–52. Information about U.N. delisting
procedures, including a timeline of changes to the delisting procedures and statistics
regarding delisting requests, can be found on the U.N. website. Focal Point for De-listing
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1730 (2006), UN SECURITY COUNCIL
SANCTIONS COMMITTEES, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/dfp.shtml.
344. The United States has only one regulation that allows a person to seek
administrative reconsideration of their designation. 31 C.F.R. § 501.807 (2014). A person
seeking delisting does not have access to evidence used by OFAC in its decision to
designate, is not afforded a hearing, and although the person will receive a written decision
containing OFAC’s disposition, there is no timeframe by which OFAC must make its
decision. Id. The same point can be made with respect to FATF’s blacklisting campaign,
which, despite being “extraordinarily effective,” FATF ended in response to widespread
criticism. Krisch, supra note 62, at 24; see also Rainer Hülsse, Even Clubs Can’t Do Without
Legitimacy: Why the Anti-Money Laundering Blacklist Was Suspended, 2. REG. &
GOVERNANCE 459 (2008).
345. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
346. See Krisch, supra note 62, at 31–33 (discussing the need for procedural mitigation in
response to the ongoing shift away from consent-based international law).
347. Stewart, supra note 319, at 213.
348. Id. at 244.
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CONCLUSION
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has effected a profound shift in its national
security strategy: it has harnessed foreign banks in the pursuit of vital security
goals. This shift introduces “dollar unilateralism” as a new mode for projecting
U.S. power. Dollar unilateralism raises questions about how the government enlists
foreign banks, especially those with weak or no ties to U.S. markets. Drawing on
examples such as Iran’s nuclear weapon policies, the Article argues that the U.S.
government has used its central position in global finance to enlist foreign banks in
its effort to isolate targeted entities and track illicit financial flows. Relying on the
special status of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency, the government has
deployed three novel formal and informal legal tactics: financial sticks, high-profile
blacklists, and direct diplomacy. Dollar unilateralism is effective under three
conditions related to industry structure, policy acceptability, and bargaining
asymmetry. Ultimately, dollar unilateralism challenges a widespread assumption
about the increasing necessity of multilateral cooperation and raises new concerns
about the government’s political accountability, both domestically and globally.

